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This study evaluates the Subsistence Prime Vendor program in the Armed Services 
and the Department ofDefense (DoD). This thesis provides an assessment of Prime 
Vendor successes, concerns, and whether this program can be implemented for 
contingencies and contingency rations. Additionally, this study explores the use of Total 
Asset Visibility (T A V) in defining the interface between the military and commercial 
sectors. 
Prime Vendor (and Direct Vendor) programs were initiated in 1993 to achieve 
cost savings in the supply and distribution of subsistence to DoD customers. The intent of 
the Prime Vendor program is to provide the military with an exceptional distribution and 
inventory control methodology. However, several critical issues remain unaddressed. 
Force preparedness and readiness in wartime remain nagging questions. Despite the 
momentum that this and other privatization efforts have gained, many of the benefits, 
specifically with respect to cost-savings, have not been fully identified or realized in "real" 
terms. 
Current Total Asset Visibility (TA V) ventures and projects still fail to identify and 
articulate the interface between commercial and military logistics systems. Subsequently, I 
propose that the interface between the military and civilian logistics structures must occur 
in CONUS (Continental United States) or at the wholesale level in-theater. The 
aggressive use ofEDI (Electronic Data Interchange) can promote high levels of 
administrative efficiency and accuracy once this interface is established. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on the Subsistence Prime Vendor (SPV) program and 
concentrates on its applicability to contingency operations. Subsistence Prime Vendor is 
the use of commercial companies to perform inventory and distribution functions 
previously done by the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC). Contingency 
operations span a broad range of military operations from "Operations Other than War" 
(Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia) to "War" (Desert Storm). This analysis will assess the military 
ability to provide subsistence in support of the national contingency mission of two nearly-
simultaneous medium regional conflicts ("War"). The term "subsistence" will be used 
extensively as the Army's general term for food items. Total Asset Visibility (TAV) has 
become increasingly important as both the commercial and public sectors attempt to 
reduce inventory and increase responsiveness. T A V enables managers to know exactly 
"what" supplies are "where" in the supply pipeline. Special emphasis will be placed on 
defining the interface between the military and commercial sectors through T A V 
initiatives for this commodity. 
Peacetime subsistence distribution through the Subsistence Prime Vendor Program 
has been judged to be a viable (ABC News, March 1996; DPSC, September 1996) supply 
concept. Prime Vendor clearly does address many peacetime customer complaints with 
the current Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC) distribution system. Brand name 
products are now available to military Dining Facilities, and the response time from 
vendors has significantly improved. However, definitive cost-data have not been 
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generated and are not available. (DPSC was reluctant to release detailed cost data due to 
incompleteness). The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is working with the civilian sector 
on applying this model to other supply commodities. However, the long-term effect ofthe 
SPV Program on wartime readiness is a significant concern. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Privatization, downsizing, outsourcing, and consolidation are trends within the 
Federal Go\·ernment today. Department ofDefense (DoD) activities represent a 
significant portion of discretionary spending and have been reduced to realize the "peace 
dividend." Fueled by the Defense Management Review (DMR) process, tighter Federal 
budgets, and other initiatives, the privatization of many warehousing functions in DoD has 
become a reality. These efforts started with the elimination of intermediate stock levels 
and the consolidation of supply depots. Other areas now are being pursued to continue 
the trend. 
1. Prime Vendor 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) initiated the Prime Vendor and Direct 
Vendor models in 1993 to achieve cost-savings in the supply and distribution of medical 
supplies to DoD customers (Medical Prime Vendor). The goals of these programs are to 
achieve cost-savings by reducing inventories, personnel and support infrastructures, and to 
gain efficiencies by transferring these functions from the public to the private sector. In 
1995, DLA applied the Prime Vendor model to food items underthe rubric of Subsistence 
Prime Vendor. 
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Meanwhile, the Prime Vendor initiative is pushing forward at full steam with little 
consideration for many unresolved concerns and issues that still require attention. Despite 
the cost-savings propounded by program advocates, clear cost-savings data have not been 
adequately identified. Clearly, there are cost-savings to be realized in reducing inventory, 
infrastructure and personnel levels, but little documented evidence of long-term systemic 
savings exists. 
2. Concerns 
Readiness remains the principal Service concern with Prime Vendor programs. 
When the support infrastructures are drawn down, the capability and willingness of 
commercial vendors to maintain affordable support is untested. Many other support issues 
also remain to be solved, including; local delivery procedures to ships, packing and shelf 
life requirements, price standardization, records-keeping, asset tracking (T A V), and 
accountability. 
3. Inventory Visibility 
Obtaining visibility of requisitions and supplies in both the military and vendor 
distribution systems will be critical to resupplying military consumers accurately. 
Currently, all the Services are pursuing research into real-time requisition flow and supply 
status information. One example is the Army's Total Asset Visibility initiative. This 
initiative allows customers to see the current location of either a requisition in the supply 
system or the item filling that requisition. These initiatives benefit not only the consuming 
unit, but allow logistics managers to more accurately forecast resupply times and to 
expedite supplies according to user needs. 
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Current Total Asset Visibility initiatives are limited to providing visibility to 
supplies only within the confines of the DoD management information systems. 
Integrative TA V programs, such as Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTA V), are being used to 
provide logistics inter-operability of the Services. However, no such integration currently 
is possible with the commercial sector. The information interface between the military and 
commercial sectors cannot provide instantaneous visibility over civilian contractor-
initiated government shipments. A Department of Transportation (DoT) system, 
VENEX-2, will be analyzed as a potential system to define this interface. VENEX-2 
possesses the potential to enhance existing Service T A V capabilities by directly providing 
commercial shipment data to military information systems. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The research objective of this thesis is to assess how the Prime Vendor program 
can provide the military with an exceptional distribution and inventory control method in 
the event of a contingency. (White, D., June 1993; White, K., December 1994) Precisely 
how wartime resupply will occur is an unresolved issue in current contingency plans. The 
idea of outsourcing operations (through Prime Vendor) that do not add "value" to the 
military enterprise has merit (Skibble, December 1995). However, with the introduction 
of commercial suppliers, the military will still retain control over logistics systems 
established in hostile conflict zones. Training and logistics interfaces between military 
personnel and civilian distribution systems will be critical to both the ability to resupply 
and to forecast demand. 
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1. Decision Making and Planning 
The analysis of current qualitative decision modeling and planning will be critical 
to implementing a program such as Prime Vendor. Through analysis of commercial sector 
experience and logistics risk management, it can be determined what portions of the 
logistics structure (core competencies) should remain under DoD control. Logistics risk 
management should identify elements that are not adding value to become candidates for 
outsourcing via Prime Vendor. DoD must then develop incentive.programs to motivate 
subsequent DoD suppliers to further minimize the total risk assumed by the Services. The 
mating of accurate plans and a pro-active supply methodology are crucial to readiness 
maintenance. Current Army contingency plans, vendor capabilities, and systems 
weaknesses will be examined in Chapter III with the Unitized Group Ration family of 
operational rations. 
2. Adding "Value" with Total Asset Visibility 
It is necessary for logisticians to provide end-users real-time or near-real-time 
status when and where possible. In order to do this, the Services must "see" the entire 
supply process from the distributor to the military supply handler. This ability is part of an 
ongoing effort called Total Asset Visibility (TAV). While integration of Service systems 
are taking place, current Army tactical distribution systems cannot interface directly with 
the commercial sector. Subsistence Prime Vendor has not been a focus for this effort, but 
it is being used to build an interface with peacetime Army food management systems. 
Thus, SPV presents an ideal environment in which to develop a tactical "seamless 
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logistics" model incorporating Total Asset Visibility. (Harman, January/February 1996, 
Robison, July/ August 1995) 
The potential for cost-savings in time, personnel and equipment by using T A V in 
conjunction with Prime Vendor is enormous. This potential is best described in the 
following quote; 
We had to open some 28,000 of the 41,000 arriving containers 
right there on the docks just to find out what was in them, We hauled a lot 
of containers 2, 000 miles out into the desert to find that 1 0 percent of their 
contents were intended for the front-line troops, whereas 90 percent 
belonged to units back near the port. (Pagonis and Cruikshank, 1992) 
From the existing T A V initiatives, it is known that combined "joint" visibility of 
Service inventories can both decrease the amount required in wholesale inventories, and 
provide theater CINC' s the ability to "cross-level" in-theater to maximize force readiness. 
Decreased resources and joint programs (such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) demand a 
more comprehensive system of inventory management and visibility. Inventory 
parochialism is a readiness detractor. (U.S. Department of Transportation, December, 
1995) 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the course of this thesis the following questions are addressed: 
- Can Subsistence Prime Vendor be applied in contingency operations for 
operational rations configuration? 
- What are the lessons learned from the medicaVsurgical and pharmacy Prime 
Vendor contracts that can be applied to Subsistence? 
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- Can vendors provide the quantity of subsistence components the Army will 
require in support of current contingency plans? Adequate support of Army 
requirements involves getting the right amount of supplies to the right place, at the 
right time. Timing of supply flow from commercial vendors is critical in the supply 
of subsistence components that build meal modules. · 
- How can the Prime Vendor Program be implemented to provide Total Asset 
Visibility for operational ration production in a contingency? 
D. METHODS 
The primary approach used in this thesis is to outline specifics of the Department 
of the Army's (DA) intent for subsistence resupply in both peace and contingencies. 
Secondly, capabilities and policies of support agencies such as Defense Personnel Support 
Center and the commercial sector are analyzed to provide insight into the congruence or 
divergence of plans with current mandates and planning. Finally, discrepancies and areas 
of concern in the Army's planned contingency ration (the Unitized Group Ration) are 
identified in light of this convergence or divergence. 
This thesis relies primarily on personal interviews and relevant published sources 
for historical and organizational data. These sources include General Accounting Office 
(GAO) reports, collected vendor data, an array of published Prime Vendor-related articles 
or reports, and interviews with commercial wholesale food vendors, DPSC personnel, 
Prime Vendor Task Force personnel, Army subsistence and Force XXI Battle Lab 
personnel. These interviews were conducted in person, by telephone, and via electronic 
mail with primary action officers. Questions asked in interviews were organized around 
the primary research questions outlined previously but tailored to the individual's area of 
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expertise (i.e., Industrial Base Analysis, Unitized Group Rations, Army Subsistence 
Policy, Prime Vendor). 
The primary sites selected for on-site interviews were the Defense Personnel 
Support Center (DPSC), Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), and the U.S. 
Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S). These sites represent the major 
proponent agencies for the Prime Vendor program and the Army Field Feeding System. 
On-site interviews were conducted with heads of offices and activities directly related to 
Prime Vendor. At DPSC, 20 personnel were interviewed from the Industrial Support 
Branch, Produce Unit, Prime Vendor Regions, Readiness Business Unit, Distribution 
Branch, Medical Material, and Food Service Unit. Interviews at CASCOM and 
USAQMC&S activities occurred at Fort Lee with nine primary action officers from the 
Prime Vendor Project, Class I Automation, Total Asset Visibility, Battle Lab, and Force 
XXI offices in separate meetings. One remaining on-site interview was conducted with 
the Defense Language Institute (DLI) Food Service Officer to gather specific site data on 
Direct Vendor. Supplemental interviews were conducted with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Department of the Army, and other government activities via electronic 
mail and telephone to clarify technologies or concepts originated in on-site meetings and 
initial publications research. 
Three commercial vendors also were selected for interviews of their distribution 
policies and plans according to applicability to the subsistence commodity and willingness 
to be interviewed. Of these vendors, one was a Prime Vendor, and two were worldwide 
vendors. Of the two worldwide vendors, Purdue Farms is a major frozen and chilled meat 
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supplier, while Nestle represents an international food manufacturer producing a broad 
band of products. Additionally, neither Nestle nor Purdue have direct vested interests in 
current Prime Vendor contracts. 
Published sources used in this thesis provided policy and procedures guidelines by 
which to evaluate the Prime Vendor Program. Government reports (i.e., Inspector 
General and GAO reports) often provided very specific data on the subject matter. 
However, when related areas outside the narrow subject ofPrime Vendor also were 
considered, a broader picture of the problem emerged. To broaden this picture and to 
provide relevant feedback on commercial practices, several management publications, 
business articles, and other DoD documents were used to evaluate the use of commercial 
business practices in managing subsistence distribution. 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope ofthe analysis will be on Army implementation ofPrime Vendor and 
Total Asset Visibility Projects as related to the operational rations in a contingency. This 
thesis analyzes the Subsistence Prime Vendor Program as currently applied to peacetime, 
garrison operations. The current Subsistence Prime Vendor Program was not originally 
designed to be used on a regular basis in contingencies. This research also focuses on the 
use of Subsistence Prime Vendor as applied to the Army tactical food distribution system. 
Though applied to Army systems, the same basic concepts are applicable to all services. 
This is especially true for the discussion on Total Asset Visibility (TAV). 
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This study examines the Force XXI Class I (Subsistence) efforts being conducted 
at Fort Lee, VA, by the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) Battle Lab in 
conjunction with the Army Center for Excellence, Subsistence (ACES). Some analysis of 
Navy sites and concerns are presented, but the major viewpoints expressed will be from an 
Army perspective. Although focusing primarily on one Service, this thesis provides viable 
recommendations that can be tailored by other Services according to their specific needs. 
Although the Prime Vendor concept was initiated in 1993 for pharmaceutical 
supplies, Prime Vendor initiatives remain in dynamic change. The Subsistence Prime 
Vendor program has continued to change while this thesis was being researched and 
written, and some inconsistencies may be incurred by the time this thesis is distributed. 
For example, in July 1996, Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (FF&V) were removed from the 
SPV program, and control over these items was given back to the Defense Personnel 
Supply Center (DPSC). 
F. CURRENT SUBSISTENCE PRACTICES 
Current subsistence requisitioning procedures are Service-specific. There is no 
integration or visibility of subsistence inventories. The process is paper-intensive with an 
extensive use of forms. The average turnaround time for a requisition in the DPSC system 
has typically been about 45 days. This time includes shipping, distribution, procurement, 
handling, and movement to installation warehouses, depending on the item and season. 
Dining Facilities then draw rations from the central installation warehouse (Troop Issue 
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Subsistence Activity -TISA) for preparation by military or contracted food service 
personnel. 
Tactical food distribution differs substantially from garrison food distribution. In 
the Army, rations are requested by a cook on manual forms. These forms are hand-carried 
to a TISA or Field Ration Break Point (FRBP). This requisition is then filled from 
available stocks on-hand based on headcount and feeding cycle forecasts. The rations are 
forecasted and further requisitioned by the TISAIFRBP via paper forms. Distribution of 
the rations to the FRBP is typically by military or commercial truck. 
For tactical applications, rations may consist of Traypack (T -rations), Meals Ready 
to Eat (MRE), A-rations (fresh foods and foods requiring refrigeration), B-rations 
(dehydrated and canned foods not requiring refrigeration), or Unitized Group Rations 
(UGR). The A-ration meal generally is not used in tactical field feeding applications, 
except as supplemental items or special meals. (Harsh, September 1996) 
Prime Vendor has not been formally applied to the supply of rations in contingency 
operations. However, in more recent ventures, DLA has used Prime Vendor to supply A-
ration type items. These items have included dairy products, breads, and vegetables. 
Prime Vendor has not been used to supply B-rations, MRE's, or T-rations in any 
contingency. 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis will be divided into five parts. Chapter I provides the thesis objective 
and the scope of the analysis. Chapter II presents an overview and history of the 
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Subsistence Prime Vendor Program. The Medical Prime Vendor Program is also 
introduced and discussed because it has been used by numerous agencies as a benchmark 
for Prime Vendor initiatives. A general analysis ofboth program's successes and concerns 
will follow. In Chapter III, a general overview and discussion of Prime Vendor use in 
recent contingencies and at peacetime installations is presented. In Chapter IV, this study 
provides a specific assessment of commercial vendors for contingency support and 
operational ration provision. This Chapter also presents a discussion ofT A V and 
"Vendor Express- 2" (VENEX-2). In Chapter V, the thesis determines the ability of this 
program to resupply contingency operations and recommend an implementation strategy 
to achieve Prime Vendor Tota! Asset Visibility. 
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D. SUBSISTENCE PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) process and 
the Subsistence Prime Vendor Program (SPV). The DPSC function and purpose will be 
briefly reviewed. The Prime Vendor Program is discussed in terms ofbackground, 
history, and Prime Vendor variants. Prime Vendor has two major variants: the regional 
distributor concept used for Subsistence Prime Vendor and an installation-managed Direct 
Vendor Delivery (DVD or Direct Vendor) system using multiple local vendors. 
Medical products were the first commodities to use Prime Vend or concepts; 
subsequently, Medical Prime Vendor has become the benchmark and standard for follow-
on Prime Vendor Programs. A brief discussion of the Medical Prime Vendor Program is 
presented to provide insight to the overall strengths and weaknesses of the concept. 
Concerns and benefits of Prime Vendor contracts and methods are identified at the close 
of the chapter. 
A. THE DPSC PROCESS 
The DPSC is located in Philadelphia, P A, and purchases approximately 90 percent 
of the subsistence consumed by the Armed Forces (GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 1993). 
Founded in 1965 to centralize the function of subsistence purchases, DPSC has remained 
virtually unchanged despite many improvements in the commercial food distribution 
industry. DPSC provides food for both DoD customers (including overseas installations) 
and numerous non-DOD customers. Last year, DPSC serviced 298 non-DoD customers. 
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These customers include agencies such as the Bureau ofPrisons, Job Corps, Veterans 
Administration, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the General 
Services Administration. (Amato, August 1996; Faso August 1996) 
DPSC purchases subsistence items from a variety of suppliers and then stores them 
or arranges transportation of items to installation food warehouses (Troop Issue Support 
Activities (TISA-Army) or Fleet Industrial Supply Centers (FISC-Navy)). DPSC stores 
semi-perishable foods (dry and canned goods) in five CONUS depots and one overseas 
depot in Gcrmcrsheim, Germany. Perishable foods (fresh or frozen fruits, vegetables 
(FF&V) and meat) are purchased by one of five Defense Subsistence Offices (DSO) 
located in Philadelphia, PA; Tidewater, VA; Jacksonville, FL; San Francisco, CA; and 
Seattle, WA (Faso, July 1996) 
Subsistence items purchased by DSOs generally are not warehoused longer than 
48 hours by DPSC. When possible, items are shipped directly from farmers fields or 
processing plants to installations via commercial food vendors. In some cases, west coast 
items are held for a short period (0-48 hours) or "cross-docked" at distribution centers. If 
cross-docking is used, the food arrives at a distribution center from the vendor, is 
inspected by USDA inspectors, and is shipped out via third party distribution to the 
installation. The distribution cross-docking facilities typically hold food for only a matter 
ofhours. (Defense Subsistence Office-Los Angeles, August 1996) 
Installation warehouses consolidate both DPSC shipments and end-user requests. 
DPSC shipments are placed into inventory and issued to the end-users (ships, dining 
facilities, units in field locations, etc.). End-users normally forecast and request rations up 
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to 45 days in advance from the TISA (Prior, June 1996). Dining facilities and other 
customers then pick up their rations from the TISA at periodic intervals. 
DoD inventories have been characterized by GAO and Congress as unnecessarily 
large with a poor stock turnover rate. The DPSC inventory, worth in excess of$132 
million, can fill approximately 82 days ofDoD demand. Installation warehouses maintain 
enough inventory to meet approximately 45 days of demand at a monetary value in excess 
of $200 million. DPSC inventories do not include those inventories maintained by the 
Services in TISAs and similar activities. These Service activities also maintain inventories 
of differing quantities, according to Service Regulations and to differing mission 
requirements. For instance, Navy shore facilities maintain approximately 32 days of 
supply, Navy ships and Army TISAs maintain up to 45 days of supply, and Army dining 
facilities maintain about 3 days of supply. This results in a "layered" inventory system in 
many locations with low turnover rates and long lead times. This "layering" of inventory 
also creates high cumulative inventory levels when measured boD-wide, and results in 
some DPSC inventory items being held for up to two years or more. GAO has stated that 
DPSC inventory turns over (on average for all items) less than twice a year. DPSC 
managers have challenged the GAO measurements, as discussed later. (GAO/NSIAD-93-
110, June 1993) 
There are many inefficiencies which contribute to the excessively large inventories. 
For years, there was little incentive for DPSC to become more efficient because defense 
activities generally had to purchase from them unless items were demonstrably less 
expensive from other sources (GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 1993). The initiation ofthe 
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Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) system in 1991, however, allowed customers 
to buy food from wherever they wanted (Faso, June 1996). Phone interviews with DPSC 
managers have confirmed that this did force DPSC to become more efficient.and 
competitive, but customers may have continued to buy exclusively from DPSC due to 
either familiarity or ease of requisitioning. 
DPSC does not maintain visibility over Service subsistence stock levels. Once 
subsistence items are issued, DPSC cannot, and does not, track cumulative inventory 
levels or location of stock at installations. This lack of visibility forces DPSC to increase 
protection from "stockouts" (failure to have an item on hand when demanded) by building 
inventory. As a result, DPSC's forecasting methods facilitate its requisition process, but 
also build excess inventory. This creates procurement lead times of 120 to 205 days. 
DPSC subsequently requires base warehouses to order 30 days (or more) in advance. To 
offset this long lead time, base warehouses increase their inventory size beyond required 
levels. Services in contiguous locations cannot automatically share inventory data, 
resulting in duplicated installation inventories and warehouse functions. These practices 
and asset visibility shortfalls contribute to unnecessarily large DoD food inventories. 
(Heivilin, March 1995) 
The cost of operating DPSC's system is excessive (GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 
1993) and not entirely accounted for in the DPSC prices. DPSC uses a 16.6% (Fiscal 
Year 1993) surcharge to cover the cost of procuring and distributing food. This surcharge 
figure is the most accurate figure that could be achieved in the research for this thesis. 
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Numbers gathered from DPSC and other sources varied widely, but generally did center 
around this figure. 
The costs of operating intermediary storage activities (TISA' s, Dining Facilities, 
etc.) and food distribution to end-users are not specifically accounted for by DPSC. The 
costs that are accounted for by DPSC amount to approximately $64 million per year to 
operate depots and DSOs. (GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 1993) 
B. SUBSISTENCE PRIME VENDOR AND DIRECT VENDOR 
The Subsistence Prime Vendor Program is a DPSC-managed contract with 
regional vendors (full-line food distributors) who deliver subsistence directly to dining 
facilities. This process is outlined in Figure 1. 
Prime Vendor contracts with distributors are regional cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contracts. Suppliers are paid the subsistence cost, according to a DPSC price schedule, 
plus a twelve percent (on average) fixed fee. In this contract, the vendor assumes 
responsibility for transportation from the vendor warehouse to the dining facility, 
bypassing the TISA, FISC, and DPSC facilities. By performing this function, Prime 
Vendor decreases the need for installation and depot inventories while reducing direct 
government transportation costs. The vendor provides almost all inventory functions as 
part of the contract and delivers directly to dining facilities or ships in U.S. ports. The 
commercial vendor is also responsible for delivering food items every 2-3 days in 
accordance with individual dining facility forecasts. (Ford, September 1996) 
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Figure 1: Pre-Prime Vendor supply flow (overview). 
Prime Vendor provides a broader spectrum of more familiar, brand-name food 
labels than previous DPSC food inventories "bringing grocery store names into the 
military dining facilities" (Stefansky, November 1994 ). Vendors in the program can 
provide almost all peacetime garrison subsistence (except FF&V and items selected for 
continued supply be DPSC) direct to the dining facility. On Army installations, TISAs 
previously held approximately thirty to forty-five days of subsistence for all Dining 
Facilities. Prime Vendor reduces this amount to three days of supply for emergencies 
(winter storms, floods, etc.). During the Subsistence Prime Vendor test conducted in 
1995, installation inventories for all Services reduced from a composite of 44.01 days of 
supply (DOS) to 5 DOS (Army and Air Force) and 8. 75 DOS (Navy). This resulted in an 
estimated $7,505,379 one-time inventory savings (Bryant, June 1996). Under Prime 
Vendor, the only rations which are exclusively held by DPSC are military-specific field and 
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operational rations (MRE' s, T-Rations, etc.). These items are sent to installation TIS As 
based on projected field needs of supported customers (ACES Information Paper, July 
1995; Prior, February 1996). In general, units that deploy to field locations for training 
are the customers of operational rations. These units base ration requests for operational 
rations according to the unit training schedule and quarterly training calendar. Long range 
predictions of field requirements are also given to the installation up to one year in 
advance. 
The automation backbone of the Prime Vendor concept is the Subsistence Prime 
Vendor Interpreter (SPVI). Currently, each Service has unique methods for processing 
requisitions from dining facilities to DPSC. These methods contain varying degrees of 
automation and manual forms unique to each Service. The automation systems used by 
the Services cannot currently "talk" directly with vendor systems. SPVI provides a 
uniform DoD interface between distributors and each Service. The uniform interface 
allows the replacement of Service-specific forms and automation systems with a standard 
electronic transaction. 
In essence, SPVI translates a Service's dining facility orders (generated by current 
systems) into a form that is understandable by the Prime Vendor's systems. The Prime 
Vendor requisition processing cycle with SPVI is outlined in Figure 2 (Caplan, January 
1996; Yudiski, July 1996; Blanco, March 1996). The transaction with the vendor by 
SPVI conforms to Electronic Commerce requirements commonly used by the private 
sector. Electronic Commerce requirements outline a standard set of automated 
interchanges defined by Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) transaction sets to perform 
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functions such as ordering and billing. The requisition systems that have been integrated 
by SPVI (such as the Army's Army Food Management Information System-AFMIS) are 
peacetime systems. Each Service maintains additional, separate ordering systems for 
tactical rations and tactical exercises. Tactical ration ordering systems rely heavily on 
manual procedures and separate processes from peacetime subsistence requisition cycles. 
Theoretically. Service tactical requisition systems can be automated and designed to 
interface with peacetime automation systems, which will then communicate through SPVI 
to vendors (Fleming, July 1996). This concept will be further discussed in Chapter IV. 
CURRENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
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(FISC) 
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Figure 2: Current Flow (Detailed), Numbers along arrows correspond to the EDI 
transaction set used (Source: LCDR Yudiski, NAVSUP, 18 AUG 96). 
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The Direct Vend or concept of subsistence support is a modification of the Prime 
Vendor concept. In designated areas, vendors are contracted by the installation 
contracting officer through Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs). These contracts are 
locally controlled, managed, billed, and paid by the installation, in contrast to Prime 
Vendor contracts under DPSC control. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) is an 
example of such a contract arrangement and will be discussed in depth in Chapter III. 
Direct Vendor contracts decentralize contract management and vendor selection, 
allowing installations to use multiple vendors, according to local command priorities, 
while satisfying Department ofDefense food standards. While Prime Vendor contracts 
are efficient for large installations requiring large suppliers, Direct Vend or contracts 
efficiently accommodate the needs of smaller installations. This type of contract also 
allows smaller vendors to compete for business. 
C. SUBSISTENCE PRIME VENDOR GOALS 
A GAO Report released on August 4, 1995 moved Subsistence Prime Vendor 
(SPV) into full swing. This GAO Report, and another completed previously in 1993, 
highlighted a growth in defense inventories in excess of $60 billion between 1980 and 
1988 (GAO/NSIAD-95-142, August 4, 1995; GAO/NSIAD-93-155, June 7, 1993). 
These inventories account for approximately 60% of defense spending. Overall, inventory 
levels have not decreased at a rate commensurate with recent force reductions 
(GAO/NSIAD-93-155, June 7, 1993). In 1995, GAO released a prepared statement to 
the House ofRepresentatives specifically targeting $77.5 billion in secondary inventory 
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items of which GAO maintains that $36.3 billion is excess (Heivilin, March 1995). 
Excessive inventory on-hand both prevents funds from being used for other purposes and 
is expensive to maintain. A reduction in inventory levels would allow more to be spent in 
operational and modernization efforts. Although the inventory levels highlighted by GAO 
are not just subsistence items, these items are widely seen as commercial goods that can be 
outsourced. It is hoped that outsourcing such commercial goods will result in lower costs 
through commercial competition. 
The Department of Defense, for the most part, concurs with these GAO findings. 
In testimony before Congress on March 23, 1995 (Heivilin, March 1995), GAO 
referenced DoD's position on Business Practice Improvement across all commodities. 
GAO stated that the adoption of better business practices is essential to reducing 
infrastructure and poor inventory management. If at all possible, commercial goods and 
practices should be used to lower costs. This should be done through open competition or 
through the greater economies of scale and profit-focus of the commercial sector. 
Prime Vendor initiatives are designed to enhance private sector involvement in the 
distribution and inventory functions of the Department ofDefense. Both DoD and 
Congress are pushing for the integration of redundant and Service-common logistics 
functions into a centrally-managed, competitive business atmosphere. The integration of 
Service infrastructures would create consolidation of inventories, decreasing aggregate 
inventory levels required to meet demand requirements. Also, this integration would make 
it easier for Defense activities to interface with the civilian sector. The differing Service 
systems would be replaced by common methods and practices making contracting easier 
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and speeding transfer of assets between the Services. As Service infrastructures are 
integrated, certain functions that do not add "value" to the military mission can be 
eliminated from government control. These functions can then be transferred to the 
private sector where competition and substantial industrial bases can keep prices down, 
while improving response time to the end-user at a minimum risk to military readiness 
(Henderson, August 1996). Infrastructure consolidation and outsourcing of functions can 
allow the Services to shift more personnel and resources to focus on their primary 
warfighting task. 
As mentioned previously, in the current DPSC system, Air Force, Army, and Navy 
installation warehouses cannot share subsistence stockage information. When installations 
are geographically very close, each installation may carry a duplicate inventory to that of 
neighboring bases. To compound this problem, each Service maintains separate ordering 
and requisition systems. These systems do not have the capability to directly communicate 
or exchange information. Therefore, even if inventory information were to be shared 
among installations in an effort to reduce redundant warehouse space or line items, there is 
no expeditious way to process requisitions from another Service and perform appropriate 
billings. 
Subsistence Prime Vendor (SPV) is intended to eliminate this inherent redundancy. 
This will be partly accomplished by bringing in more sophisticated automated ordering 
systems from the private sector. At many sites (especially TIS As and dining facilities), 
inventories are maintained by manual calculations and requisition lead times (requiring 
prior notice of anticipated demands) of30 days or more (Figure 1). For example, TISAs 
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require dining facilities to order 30 days in advance. TISAs then order from DPSC and 
receive the item at the date forecasted by the dining facility (30 days after requisition). 
This lead-time is caused by a lack of real-time, dynamic data flow between DPSC and 
dining facilities. 
Incorporation of civilian inventory technology should reduce the on-hand 
inventories of food required by providing real-time demand data to vendors. As vendors 
become able to accept real-time demand data (through SPVI), they will assume the 
subsistence inventory responsibility from the government for all items except 
defense-specific combat rations. This allows the government to then eliminate jobs and 
warehouse space that is no longer needed. Additionally, Prime Vendor consolidates all 
Service demands in a region, eliminating overlapping installation inventories. 
Incorporation of the private sector allows for faster delivery of foods, without the 
need for large inventories. Since real-time demand is used by vendor, SPVI had to be 
developed to allow the Services to share a common system interface with vendors. By 
adopting a common interface across all Services, adoption of industry-standard inventory 
practices, such as Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), using Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI) can occur. ECR has been used in the grocery industry to allow suppliers to directly 
obtain demand data, allowing them to resupply the store more efficiently. Previously, the 
Services have been unsuccessful in developing such joint inventory control systems. 
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D. BENEFITS 
SPV, as well as Direct Vendor, capitalizes on the many benefits of commercial 
food distribution practices by reducing the logistics pipeline. The primary benefits are 
derived from: cost -savings in distribution and warehousing, inventory reduction, improved 
service, better quality, automation of manual operations, and decreased facilities expense. 
Additional benefits are gained through faster response times and the perception of higher 
quality through the use of household brand-names in dining facilities. 
1. Cost Savings 
The major benefit ofPrime Vendor is an immediate cost-savings. Although there 
is limited hard data available to quantify the savings, total cost-savings are predicted to 
exceed the fixed-fee cost of contracting with vendors. The program is expected to reduce 
DoD distribution costs at all levels because regional vendors will provide transportation to 
dining facilities. Prime Vendor substantially reduces DPSC and installation warehousing, 
thereby decreasing direct storage and handling costs. The diminished storage and handling 
requirements reduces workforce needs, ultimately saving money through personnel 
elimination. However, some personnel will need to be reassigned to contract management 
functions. The need to expand the contracting function limits the cost-benefit of 
warehouse personnel attrition. Cost-savings are also seen in procurement costs through 
the reduction in the DoD buying structure. 
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2. Time Reduction 
By reducing the "order pipeline" length, SPV allows customers to significantly 
lower inventory levels by relying on just-in-time delivery for food support. The reduction 
of inventory, both wholesale and end-use, will result in a substantial one-time savings. To 
draw-down inventory, DPSC and the Services will "eat" existing inventories to lower 
levels, minimizing waste. 
3. Increased Responsiveness 
Prime Vendor tends to increase responsiveness because vendors reside in closer 
proximity to the customer. Regional vendors already have substantial distribution 
networks setup to satisfy existing civilian customers such as restaurants, hospitals, and 
groceries. Their substantial transportation network enables vendors to make multiple 
shipments quickly. Closer proximity of vendor warehouses also allows them to deliver 
fresher products more efficiently. Use of vendors has substantially reduced request-to-
delivery time to a matter of days. (Allen, September 1996) 
4. Quality Improvements 
Quality is improved because the customer can now select a broader range of 
products, including national brand-names, and receive fresher products. Quality can be 
defined as a low variance from customer expectations. One of the chief complaints with 
DPSC supply was in receiving "old" item (shelf-life extensions) and in getting only generic 
products. The customer now receives a larger selection of items, sizes, and brands while 
retaining the convenience of being able to place most orders from one source. The ability 
to select over a wide range of product brand-names, and prices, allows Dining Facility 
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Mangers more financial management flexibility and increases both the cooks and patrons 
opinion ofthe food items being served. (Stefansky, November 1994) 
5. Increased Efficiency 
Electronic ordering through SPVI replaces manual forms preparation, thereby 
increasing efficiency in dining facilities. The development of electronic ordering also 
allows the Services to more closely conform to DoD Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
compliance goals. EDI is a standard transaction set used in private-sector commerce that 
allows proprietary automation systems to communicate. By adopting EDI, translation of 
data onto manual forms is eliminated. The decreased use of manual forms drastically 
reduces the overall administrative burden throughout DoD. Prime Vendor relationships 
also add flexibility to DoD order processes by allowing the use of telephonic order 
corrections to respond to sudden changes in demand. These telephone interchanges are 
conducted from the dining facility to the vendor, eliminating bureaucratic red-tape and 
increasing efficiency even more. 
Military construction funds required to modernize, refurbish, or replace existing 
subsistence facilities may be sharply reduced. Planned military construction in other areas 
may be avoided if existing subsistence facilities are utilized in support of those 
requirements. If some of the buildings that had been used to store subsistence can be 
converted to other uses, if might be possible to cancel new construction projects. Also, 
some vacated facilities could be leased to other activities or government agencies to 
realize a gain to DoD. 
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E. CONCERNS 
Although there are many benefits gained with the Subsistence Prime Vendor 
Program, some concerns also arise. The following questions must be answered for 
Subsistence Prime Vendor to be a success: Will the vendors be able to effectively deliver 
to ships? Can vendors meet surges in demand without affecting operational readiness? 
How will the cost of subsistence change when DoD loses some control over initial 
procurement? Can the predicted cost savings be realized? Will the Services have an 
adequate number of trained food service handlers to deploy when needed? And, will 
commercial differences in packaging adversely affect operations? These questions will be 
discussed in following paragraphs. 
An additional concern with the outsourcing of the subsistence function is created 
when the larger organizational context ofthe military is considered. While functions that 
are not providing value to current operations are candidates for outsourcing, it is possible 
that a key function that is providing a greater organizational competency may be 
outsourced. When this occurs it creates a "loose brick" in the greater organizational 
strategy that can be exploited by a competing nation. Often these "loose bricks" are 
initially misidentified as non-value added functions, but actually create a great structural 
weakness in strategy once they are removed. These "loose bricks" create opportunities 
for surprise as the organization loses visibility of the function. Therefore, careful selection 
and implementation of outsourcing must occur to prevent the formation of "loose bricks" 
in the overall operational strategy bulwark. (Hamal and Prahalad, May-June 1989) 
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1. Vendor Flexibility 
A natural concern for the Navy is the resupply of ships. Some Navy ships are 
deployed on short notice and may require larger than normal quantities at the last minute. 
There are also security issues inherent in delivering directly to a ship. The issue of 
whether or not the distributors would have enough food on hand to deal with short notice 
ordering is untested. 
In general, peacetime, demand levels are stable and predictable. However, 
wartime demand will increase significantly and quickly. This shortfall has been addressed 
by the incorporation of"surge" clauses into Prime Vendor contracts. These clauses 
require contractors to be able to meet a specified surge level, but verification of this 
capacity is up to the contractor. Additionally, further research has revealed that these 
surge clauses allow the vendor to refuse to supply some or all items for overseas 
consumption. (Lydon, September 1996) 
2. Higher Cost of Food Items 
Commercially-procured subsistence is going to cost more. Prime Vendors typically 
incur higher prices to procure than does DPSC. One element that contributes to this 
higher cost is the difference in the price ofbrand names as compared to generic items. 
(Office ofthe UnderSecretary ofDefense (Logistics), 1995; Phillips, February 1995) The 
Defense Department is concerned that when it loses the ability to revert to a depot supply 
system, DoD may lose the ability to control prices. This could place vendors in a 
powerful position with an incentive for "price creep." Distributors have responded that 
they have to keep the costs down in order to compete for the government's business. I 
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have found little evidence that they would continue to be willing to match DPSC prices, if 
DPSC were to lose the ability to supply. Although food distribution is very nearly a 
perfectly competitive industry, vendors still have to work hard to match DPSC prices. 
3. High Modification Costs 
At first glance, it appears that the cost of owning warehouses will obviously 
decrease, if not disappear, at some sites. However, this cost is partially offset by increased 
storage costs at dining facilities. Storage space at dining facilities was more efficiently 
used with DPSC's standard container sizes. Prime Vendor's less standard containers are 
requiring most dining facilities to expand storage area and to upgrade their storage racking 
systems. This is caused by the greater variety of sizes and types of commercial rations. 
Installations have also had to retain warehouse space to store operational rations used by 
units on field exercises and to store regular rations for emergency use as discussed 
previously. The only real differential cost-savings to DoD has been where freed 
warehouse space has allowed installations to avoid new military construction (MILCON) 
projects or to terminate building leases. 
Subsistence Prime Vendor decreases warehouse personnel and material handling 
requirements. However, if employees are simply reassigned instead of eliminated, no real 
financial benefits are gained. In order to realize savings from decreased labor 
requirements, real attrition must occur. 
4. Training Active Duty Food Handlers 
The issue of keeping Active Duty material food handlers trained must be addressed 
ifPrime Vendor is to be used in contingencies. In peacetime, under the DPSC system, 
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food handlers often conducted training at TIS As and commissaries. Training of these 
food-handlers is difficult and the TISAs provided an excellent opportunity for exposure to 
all ration types in a controlled environment. The potential use of Prime Vendor in 
contingencies will require that the Services actively train these personnel on the handling, 
storage, inventory, and inspection of commercial food stuffs. The variety of packages, 
sizes, and types of commercial rations requires more comprehensive training. This has a 
direct impact on all land forces. 
During field operations, subsistence is brought to a major staging unit as outlined 
in Figure 3. This unit represents the interface between the in-theater military distribution 
system and external commercial and other distribution systems. From this point forward, 
the Services need trained food handlers and food inventory managers. Documentation and 
LEGEND 
-GSU=Gcneral Support Unit (provides wholesale 
logistics support) 
-DSU=Dircct Support Unit (provides retail logistics 
support) 
-FRBP=Field Ration Break Point (Co-located with 
DSU/GSU) 
Figure 3: Simplified Ration Flow into a Theater of Operations. 
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training programs must be developed to address the issue of training for food handlers 
with commercial-type rations ifPrime Vendor is used in contingencies. Currently, 
Services will still receive items from DPSC and DPSC personnel will do the bulk of the 
processing of any commercial rations used. It is at DPSC activities where items enter into 
the military distribution system and start to be tracked by military inventory systems. 
However, in a Prime Vendor scenario, the DPSC system will be bypassed, and rations 
will be delivered directly to FRBPs either through military or commercial transport. 
5. Commercial Item Adequacy 
Prime \'endor-supplied items also often differ from DPSC items in packaging 
dimensions. designs, and requirements. This raises four key factors. First, to minimize 
cost, DPSC must relax its restrictions on items provided from the vendors. In some cases, 
the military is changing the requirements (such as container size, unit of issue, etc.) to 
allow the use of more commercial products. An example of this is the military use of three 
pound cans of coffee. Commercial vendors and equipment generally use two-pound cans. 
As a result, only a handful of vendors supply this size, and the coffee used is often of 
lower quality and higher price than that in the two-pound cans. DPSC has subsequently 
modified their requirements to permit the purchase of two-pound cans of coffee. 
Second, many of the food service personnel are unaware of contractual 
specifications creating confusion when receiving deliveries. These personnel will have to 
be educated and trained on the changes to be expected in packaging. For instance, the 
contractor may substitute certain items of a different unit count to satisfy a demand. If the 
substitution is adequate fo~ the intended use, the dining facility should not refuse the items. 
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Third, during interviews with the Industrial Preparedness Branch at DPSC, 
concerns were raised that many substitute commercial items may not provide the 
nutritional requirements needed for contingency rations. Military requirements are 
determined according to the Military Recommended Daily Allowance (MRDA). In 
garrison feeding, this is normally not a concern because of the variety and types of foods 
served. In contingencies, however, menu possibilities are more limited, and military 
rations have been specially fortified to accommodate this problem. 
Finally, the commercial packages must also adhere to the Service's requirements in 
order to effectively build inventories designed for long shelf-life and packaging durability 
during deployed operations. Packaging must be durable to survive cross-country 
shipping, weather extremes, and field handling. Non-operational concerns must also be 
accommodated when making packaging considerations. A good example of this is the 
Navy's requirement for steel cans, as opposed to plastic jars, to meet environmental 
regulations for "plastics at sea." To accommodate those regulations and to make 
procurement easier, the Navy has plans to install "melters" on-board ships to melt waste 
plastic into forms that are easier to store and dispose of 
6. Inventory Benchmarks 
The inventory metrics used by GAO have been disputed by DPSC. Although the 
benchmarks GAO used are valid, they may not be accurately applied to DPSC. Inventory 
metrics quoted by DPSC (Faso, September 1996) are outlined in Table 1. 
Although these rates differ substantially from the GAO findings, these findings are 
consistent with two commercial companies I interviewed for this study. Both Nestle 
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Foods and Purdue Farms (Hurley, March 1995; Braden, March 1995) reported inventory 
metrics that reflected higher efficiency and productivity than those reported by DPSC, but 
DPSC's numbers were still comparable. However, the calculation methodology is 
subjective and was not the same between DPSC, Nestle, and Purdue. Also, it is evident 
that GAO considered the vastly different technologies used by DPSC and the private 
sector, but did not provide any technology recommendations. The private sector has 
Seasonal Non-Seasonal 
-Dry Goods 
Turnover Rate once per year 4 per year 
Demands highly variable highly variable 
among items among items 
Days of supply on-hand 6 mos. ave. 1.5 mos ave. 
Requisition ages 28 days 28 days 
Days to procure varies by item varies by item 
ave. 180 days ave. 145 days 
- Frozen (Fr~eze) GoQds 
Turnover Rate once per year 8 per year 
Demands highly variable highly variable 
among items among items 
Days of supply on-hand 6 mos. ave. 1. 5 mos. ave. 
Requisition ages 15 days 15 days 
Days to procure 52 days 52 days 
-Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (FF&Y) 
Turnover Rate 52 per year 52 per year 
Demands highly variable highly variable 
among items among items 
Days of supply on-hand 5 days ave. 5 days ave. 
Requisition ages 2 days 2 days 
Days to procure 1 day 1 day 
Table 1: DPSC inventory metrics for subsistence categories. (Amato, 1996; Faso, 1996) 
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invested heavily in automation, while DoD has lagged behind with incompatible systems 
and practices among the Services. The lack of adequate communication links and 
compatible automation systems alone could account for DPSC's relatively poor showing. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) focused on end-state metrics to evaluate 
DPSC against the private sector. However, these metrics do not consider how changes in 
inventory culture (GAO/NSIAD-94-193) andre-engineering efforts may actually provide 
better savings than direct outsourcing. In conversations with Purdue Farms logistics 
personnel, the significant sunk cost of facilities often drives their out-sourcing decisions 
(Hurley, March 1996). Since DPSC and DoD already have a significant subsistence 
infrastructure, it cannot be assumed that outsourcing will provide automatic savings. 
(Hamal and Prahalad, May-June 1989; Hammer, July 1996; Markels and Murray, May 
1996) In several cases, personnel involved with Prime Vendor have provided no concrete 
evidence of direct cost-savings, and have supplied "intuitive" knowledge that cost savings 
must be gained through outsourcing. It appears that infrastructure size is being used as 
an efficiency measure. Increases in efficiency will often lead to decreased infrastructure 
size, but decreasing infrastructure size does not always promote efficiency (Markels and 
Murray, May 1996). Process Centered Analysis and Velocity Management (Akin, 
January-February 1996) are two methods of analysis that should be used to drive 
efficiency decisions. Velocity Management reduces mass in logistics systems by replacing 
it with velocity (cycle times, turnover rates) and accuracy. Process Centered Analysis 
requires that the entire supply process be considered when seeking efficiency gains. 
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7. Asset Visibility 
The concerns raised with the current peacetime use of Prime Vendor are directly 
applicable to the potential use of this program during contingencies. In addition to the 
concerns detailed here, the issue of having direct visibility of a requisition and its supply 
status has yet to be addressed or tested. Despite numerous attempts to achieve Joint Total 
Asset Visibility (JTAV) across the Services and logistics disciplines (i.e. Supply, 
Transportation, and Maintenance), using Automated Manifesting System (AMS), Radio 
Frequency (RF) technologies, and Global Positioning Network/Satellite (GPN/S) 
technology, little cross-discipline integration has been achieved. This can mainly be 
attributed to insufficient funding to pursue the necessary integrating programs. 
Although it is currently possible to see the location of a shipment, it is not possible 
in the military environment to get total line item detail on a shipment at the user's terminal. 
In other words, as a supply officer in a "retail" (Direct Support - DS) warehouse, I cannot 
sit down at my inventory management terminal, query an outstanding customer 
requisition, and have my system tell me exactly where my customer's item is. It is possible 
to do this through oftline requests of the Logistics Information File (LIF) and by other 
time-intensive methods, but it is currently not possible to do this at retail supply outlets in 
near-real-time. This is especially true for requisitions that have passed over the interface 
between the military and civilian distribution systems. It is these concerns that will 
ultimately determine the success of the program. (Lorenzini, 1 Mar 94) 
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F. MEDICAL PRIME VENDOR; MODEL OF SUCCESS? 
The original Prime Vendor Program concept was first implemented in 1993 at 
three military medical facilities in the Washington D.C. area. It has been documented as 
very successful. Because of its success, it has provided a vision and a "road map" for the 
privatization of many inventory functions, especially Subsistence Prime Vendor. 
Since its inception, the Medical Prime Vendor Program has reported (DPSC, 
December 199 5 ) 
- Inventory reduction at DPSC depots 
- Inventory reduction at medical facilities 
- Reduction in disposal costs (expired medicinals) 
- Surcharge reduction 
- Annual savings due to decrease in pricing 






avg of 1 day 
Although impressive, the Medical Prime Vendor Program has not been without 
drawbacks. For example, while the use ofPrime Vendor with pharmaceuticals has been 
extremely successful, the use ofPrime Vendor in Med-Surg (Medical-Surgical) supplies 
has had mixed results. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the growth of orders from Prime Vendors for Med-Surg 
items is significantly trailing the growth of Prime Vendor orders of Pharmaceuticals. The 
rapid growth of orders in Pharmaceuticals clearly establishes the rapid acceptance of this 
program in this commodity. However, the sluggish growth in orders ofMed-Surg items is 
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Figure 4: Growth in orders under Medical Prime Vendor (DoD IG Report 96-109, May 
1996). 
indicative of problems with supplying these items via Prime Vendor. This can largely be 
attributed to technical problems encountered with this specific commodity (Table 2) 
(Fescenmeyer, September 1996). Substantial differences in the industrial base have had 
tremendous impacts on the adaptation of these DPSC commodities to Prime Vendor. 
Medical Prime Vendor is also plagued by a potential lack of visibility of products 
supplied by the vendor, once they would enter a military distribution system. In garrison, 
Pharmaceutical Industrv 
Highly Regulated 
Unique Numbering System 
Item Identification Easy 
20,000 Products 
Item Comparison Quick 
Medical/Surgical Industry 
Relatively Unregulated 
Multiple Numbers for Same Product 
Item Identification Difficult 
250,000(+) Products 
Item Comparison Tedious and Slow 
Table 2: Commodity differences in Medical Prime Vendor implementation. 
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visibility issues with pharmaceuticals are non-existent, however, distribution to deployed 
field hospitals in a foreign country is much more sensitive. In wartime, medical supplies 
are a uniquely commodity in that they do not flow through the "normal" supply network. 
Instead, a special system is used to expedite them to field hospitals and to provide 
maximum control. However, this system still relies on the existing military transportation 
system or couriers. 
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Volpe Center was working with the 
Services on a system to provide a "military-commercial" interface. This interface would 
allow visibility of the item from the vendor shop floor, through the transportation 
network, and finally into the military Total Asset Visibility network. Two programs were 
initiated, Vendor Express (VENEX) and Vendor Express- 2 (VENEX-2). However, 
Service interest and funding waned, and the program (VENEX-2) was idled. This system 
would have allowed DoD doctors to precisely follow the flow of critically needed 
material. VENEX-2 has the potential to be upgraded to "near-real-time" asset tracking, 
providing instantaneous information on the precise location of a shipment by line item 
number. This issue will be discussed in depth in Chapter IV. (Troup, July 1996) 
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ill. SITE AND OPERATION ANALYSIS 
This Chapter will provide an analysis ofPrime Vendor usage in both peacetime and 
in recent contingency operations. The review will cover the Prime Vendor trial "roll-out", 
two peacetime sites that are not completely under the Prime Vendor Program, and two 
contingency missions. Although SPV was not designed for contingency operations, it has 
been used in recent operations in a limited scale. Analysis of its use in recent missions 
provides insight to the applicability ofPrime Vendor, as a primary means of support, to 
future contingency operations. 
A. SUBSISTENCE PRIME VENDOR TRIAL 
In response to GAO reports on DoD food inventories (GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 
1993; GAO/NSIAD-94-180, August 1994), DLA conducted a test in fiscal year 1995 of 
the Prime Vendor method in a four-state region (Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and 
Florida). They separated the area into five zones and awarded each zone a prime vendor 
contract. Prime Vendor was then phased in from December 1994 to April 1995 to allow 
for Subsistence Prime Vendor Interpreter (SPVI) installation and training (as previously 
discussed). (DLA-95-A30326, May 1995) 
The initial cost savings looked very promising although DLA did not count 
personnel staffing or warehouse eliminations as savings. The test resulted in a savings of 
$12.1 million, including the cost of developing and installing SPVI. The savings 
measured in the test were mainly from $18.7 million in inventory reductions across all five 
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zones. Prime Vendor's hold inventory and their demonstrated ability to rapidly supply has 
lowered required installation and wholesale food inventory levels. (DLA-95-A30326, 
May 1995) 
Transportation costs accounted for a savings of$914,000 over a six-month period. 
The transportation savings were calculated by the reduced amount of transportation 
required from the DPSC wholesale level to the base warehouses. Prime Vendors deliver 
directly to customers, eliminating DPSC transportation expenses in these zones. Cost 
reductions as a result of the elimination of transportation from the base warehouses to 
dining facilities were not captured. (DLA-95-A30326, May 1995) 
The Prime Vendor trial revealed the potential for substantial savings in warehouse 
space, personnel, and other direct costs. Base warehouses reduced their inventories 
during the trial, freeing 40 percent of subsistence storage space. Personnel requirements 
were reduced by more than 50 percent. Other direct costs were reduced by 40 to 55 
percent. (Bryant, February 1996) 
An interview with the customer service representative at Naval Station Mayport, 
Florida revealed that the customers are also very pleased with Prime Vendor. The ships 
unanimously concur that" ... the quality has improved 100%." The Prime Vendor in 
Mayport, Beaver Street Foods, increased the variety of items available to the ships by 25 
percent, adding many desired commercial products. (Hope, February 1996) In Mayport, 
only two of 175 deliveries were interrupted by the ships' schedule, and the base support 
activity was able to take receipt ofthe items for a later delivery (Faso, February 1996). 
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The test was considered such an unconditional success that DoD shortened the test period 
to six months, and went into full scale implementation. 
B. PEACETIME SITE ANALYSIS 
1. The Defense Language Institute (DLI), Monterey, CA 
In contrast to Prime Vendor sites, the DLI has implemented a version ofPrime 
Vendor called the Direct Vendor Program. The program at DLI has allowed contracted 
vendors to meet former DPSC price schedules on all contracted items. DLI's Direct 
Vendor Program has also consistently beaten regional Prime Vendor Programs on prices, 
especially with fresh produce (Prior, February 1996). The installation is currently 
contracting with six vendors (occasionally eight) and rates vendors based on three criteria: 
best value, ability to meet demand, and price. These criteria appear in the order of 
importance. Contracts are not awarded solely on low cost, but are managed according to 
a "Best Value" concept. "Best Value" allows the TISA to select a vendor based on 
Quality versus Price. TISA then selects the vendor that they believe is providing the best 
product for the quoted price. This has allowed the installation to meet all Department of 
Defense food specifications while maintaining low costs and increased flexibility. 
(Ramscoff, February 1996; Prior, February 1996) 
This program is administered through Blanket Purchase Agreements with local 
vendors after they have documented their capability to meet the installation's contract 
requirements. It has allowed the installation to improve their public relations posture by 
placing contracts locally where possible. Because of the community link, the installation 
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has experienced reduced response and lead times when compared to some Prime Vendor 
Programs (Regional). Lead times have been reduced from 24 to six hours for regular 
order modifications and cancellations. Vendor response time has been decreased from 
prior day notice for emergency orders to a response time as fast as 20 minutes. 
(Ramscoff, February 1996) Additionally, due to the unique nature ofDLI, all 
warehousing and transportation functions have been transferred to the vendor saving 
approximately $75,000.00 annually through direct and avoided costs. Previous cost 
savings for the DLI implementation approached $750,000. However, the total cost 
computations for DLI savings have been complicated by the recent base closure ofFt Ord 
and neighboring training areas. These locations provided a significant demand sink for the 
previous warehousing activity (TISA) and the activity operated two additional satellite 
activities to support these locations. It is unclear how much the warehousing activity 
would have been reduced, even without a switch to Direct Vendor. (Ramscoff, February 
1996) 
The tight coupling of the installation to the vendor has also allowed the installation 
to emplace vendor EDI systems in the dining facility (specifically Kraft) allowing for near 
real time price updates and ordering by the centralized ordering personnel located in the 
TISA. The Dining Facility Manager places the order with the TISA, and specialized 
"commodity" personnel in the TISA select a vendor and place the order according to 
"Best Value." To further assist the Dining Facility Manager, two Quality Assurance 
Representatives conduct random sampling and quarterly inspections to ensure 
conformance to contract requirements. Monthly advisory councils and soldier exit surveys 
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are also conducted to provide customer feedback on food quality. (Ramscoff, February 
1996) 
2. Defense Distribution Depot, Norfolk, VA (DDNV) 
DDNV is a large distribution depot that provides the supply and logistic 
distribution functions to a majority of the DoD customers in the Virginia and Mid-Atlantic 
area, both ashore and afloat. In their subsistence division alone, DDNV supports more 
than 150 customer commands. The subsistence division currently employs 71 civil service 
employees and one military director. They have four subsistence warehouses containing 
more than 1000 stocked line items of subsistence valued in excess of $16 million. 
DDNV's Navy throughput alone is in excess of 5000 metric tons (MT's) each month, in 
addition to over 3000 MT's of other non-Navy requirements; clearly a large distribution 
operation. DDNV had not fully implemented Prime Vendor as ofMarch, 1996, but will 
tum over approximately 40 of their shore customers to the program after an initially 
successful test period. Redundancy ofbusiness does not pose a problem here as the shore 
facilities are distinct and separate from the other activities being served by DDNV. 
However, by working together, many benefits are being realized by this new relationship, 
as will be discussed below. (Park, January 1996) 
Doughtie Foods has been awarded the contract to support these shore customers 
(zone 1: south, mid-Atlantic region). The $19.4 million dollar contract addresses many 
service points, but there remain some concerns by DoD customers, particularly on service 
and readiness issues. The program appears to be quite successful thus far, however, as 
documented by the rapid growth of customers seeking Doughtie's services. Doughtie 
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Foods is a small business with less than 250 employees that posted over $70 million in 
sales last year. The military contract will become a large percentage ofDoughtie's 
business. Doughtie reports a gross margin between 10%-15%, and a bottom line of just 
1%-2% profit. (Ratliff, February 1996) A primary advantage to this Prime Vendor 
support includes better service ( 48 hr order time versus a normal order notice required by 
DDNV of approximately 7-10 days). In terms of service, DDNV does provide 
approximately 22% of their business as "next day quick picks," which is comparable to 
Prime Vendor. However, the Depot usually requires a 7-10 day lead time. 
A major assumption in implementing Prime Vendor is that the government 
distribution system cannot be competitive or cost effective due to unique support 
requirements. However, available data is limited to support that key point. The 
perception among program participants is that cost savings are being realized, but prior to 
DBOF accounting, DoD (and the Services) generally did not track all the economic costs 
of operating and maintaining the logistics infrastructure other than annual budgets and the 
associated payroll. Long-term cost savings above and beyond obvious immediate savings 
from downsizing are not known. However, there is potential for savings through the 
reduction of depot personnel and inventory through continued Prime Vendor expansion. 
However, some issues and concerns surface with the use of commercial vendors. 
Although commercial food standards are high, the packing, packaging, and labeling of 
subsistence items are not consistent or sufficient for instances where inventory is still 
required. For instance, Navy ships are required to carry a minimum of 45 days inventory 
on board. This inventory ranges from $100,000 on small ships to more than $1 million on 
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large ships. The use of commercial rations eliminates standardized shelf-life markings, 
making subsistence receipts take longer, and causing periodic inspections to become more 
tedious due to administrative complexity. While the commercial sector is required to put 
standardized shelf-life data on food items, actual data placement and layout on cans, 
boxes, and containers vary greatly from manufacturer to manufacturer. As a result, shelf 
life and quality may become suspect, with rotation and inventory management becoming 
more difficult. One of the key advantages to Prime Vendor deliveries is fresh subsistence 
delivered "just in time" (JIT) for immediate consumption. However, military 
requirements often call for on-hand inventories to cover contingencies and long-term use 
requirements (such as a ship patrol). (GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 1993) 
Doughtie Foods can increase their business by only 25% of the contract amount 
for the year. (Ratliff, February 1996) This may pose a problem, as many other commands 
are looking to experiment with the new program and receive Prime Vendor support. As 
ofMarch 1996, the vendor was only supporting a small percentage of the commands in 
the area that require subsistence support by the depot. If all DDNV supported commands 
participated in the program, it would call for an estimated Prime Vendor contract increase 
in excess of $100 - $120 million, well above Doughtie's capacity or the capacity of any 
single vendor in the area. Additionally, the issue of "peak service" requirements such as 
loading out an entire battle group for deployment, would be a significant surge 
requirement to a small vendor like Doughtie. To support the huge military market, 
multiple vendor's would be needed. Since this area was first researched, this is exactly 
what has occurred. The Norfolk area is now supplied by four Prime Vendors (Ford, 
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September 1996), and ships have been removed from the contract. Ship contracts will be 
handled separately from shore facilities, and DPSC is currently researching vendor ability 
to supply the remaining 23 military unique subsistence items ships require (Ford, 
September 1996). 
Prime Vendors have agreed to start filling all ofthe depot's not-carried (NC) and 
not-in-stock (NIS) requirements from other military customers. (Ratliff, February 1996) 
In tum, the Navy has discussed transhipment alternatives with the vendor to ensure 
customers, particularly the customer afloat, get the high quality, flexible service required. 
Customers using Prime Vendor have expressed that service has been the main benefit, not 
necessarily cost-savings, over organic DoD subsistence distribution systems. The 
implementation ofPrime Vendor in "steps" has been crucial to success in the huge 
Norfolk military market. 
C. PRIME VENDOR IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
Officially, Subsistence Prime Vendor was started in 1995, but the concept of 
commercial resupply in contingencies has existed since the 1991 Desert Storm War in the 
Persian Gulf In Desert Storm, commercial food items were purchased directly from food 
distributors, and shipped to military Field Ration Break Points (FRBP) in-theater. These 
food items were consolidated and packaged in-theater into Meals, Operational, Ready the 
Eat (MORE). This method of procurement has largely been considered a failure partly 
because of difficulty in properly configuring nutritionally adequate ration modules. 
(ACES, September 1996; DPSC, September 1996). 
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The MORE ration concept consisted of procuring heat and serve "Top-Shel~" 
and similar brand-name food items directly from the commercial sector and combining 
them at the FRBP into a complete individual meal. Although this concept is the first 
widespread modem use of commercial rations in a contingency, it is beyond the scope of 
this research, and will not be addressed in depth. Instead, this section will discuss 
operations that have occurred since Prime Vend or has been in operation, and will only 
reference Desert Storm Lessons Learned. 
1. Haiti Support 
In September of 1991, the elected president ofHaiti was forced into exile. As a 
result, many Haitians fled the country and were picked up by the U.S. Coast Guard and 
transported to Guantanamo (GTMO) Bay, Cuba. During the refugee period leading up to 
the military intervention in September 1994, Prime Vendor support of refugees in GTMO, 
or of the military operation in Operation Uphold Democracy, was never officially used. 
However, subsistence supplies were obtained from the regional Prime Vendor supplying 
Florida in the South East region. (Lydon, September 1996; GAO/NSIAD-96-38) 
Though Prime Vendors were used, they were not the primary means of support. 
Current Prime Vendor contracts limit the government to obtaining subsistence for 
Continental United States (CONUS) delivery only. Vendors are not required to supply 
rations for overseas locations or customers. However, during the Haiti crisis, the Prime 
Vendor did provide one million pounds of rice to Jacksonville for delivery to GTMO 
(DPSC, September 1996). This rice was used to feed the civilian population and provided 
a basic, limited menu to refugees and the civilian population ofHaiti. During the 
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following occupation of Haiti, similar techniques were used to deliver food from 
commercial vendors to deployed forces. Food distribution and supply was complicated by 
inadequate food service/distribution planning prior to the commencement to Operation 
Uphold Democracy (Richard Harsh, ACES, September 1996). Once vendors were given 
a food order, and time to react, they were able to deliver to the designated shipment points 
on schedule. (DPSC, September 1996) 
Haiti became a proving ground for subsistence Total Asset Visibility (T A V) 
experiments. In this operation, Radio Frequency (RF) tags were used to track shipments 
of supplies moving into Haiti and through the distribution system. Subsistence supplies 
shipped from both Aerial Ports ofDebarkation (APOD) and Sea Ports ofDebarkation 
(SPOD) were tagged and tracked to using units. This provided leadership with 
instantaneous visibility of where food shipments were, what type (MRE, A, B, etc.), and 
how long they had been sitting in a location. The ability to see these shipments allows the 
commander to time demand with supply flows. (Barnes, September 1996) 
The purpose of the T A V trial was to prove tracking and management 
technologies. With subsistence, the goal is prevent the problems found with subsistence 
supplies in Desert Storm. During Desert Storm, food arrived haphazardly at supply 
points, creating situations where soldiers did not have access to any variety in menu or 
type of rations. Inventories also had the tendency to build as single menu items. For 
example, soldiers complained of getting the same meal for many days or weeks in a row. 
At the end of Desert Storm, the inability to view the entire supply pipeline and 
"on-ground" aggregate inventories resulted in an estimated $2.7 billion in serviceable turn-
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ins alone (Barnes, October 1996). Firm figures are not available but approximately $8 
million dollars of excess subsistence items also accumulated (Prior, October, 1996). The 
reason for the accumulation of subsistence is disputed, i.e. the conflict was too brief, 
(Prior, October 1996). Most ofthis inventory was subsequently given away in Provide 
Comfort, transported to other areas, diverted enroute, destroyed (if damaged), or 
remained in place in Southwest Asia. (CASCOM, September 1996) 
Haiti was the first major use oftechnology_aimed at preventing logistics inventory 
growth and at being able to track specific shipments. Data provided by the interrogation 
network and tag data enabled soldiers to locate specific shipments of rations. (Volpe 
Center, December 1995) 
2. Bosnian Peace-Keeping Mission 
Subsistence Support in Bosnia has been primarily through the use of military 
rations and contracted Logistics Capability (LOGCAP). LOGCAP differs from normal 
Prime Vendor in that LOGCAP replaces an entire military function with a civilian 
contractor. Prime Vendor, on the other hand, is a contract for only a portion ofthe 
logistics function. While Prime Vendor shipments to Bosnia have not been officially used, 
the supply of subsistence from commercial vendors is occurring. In Bosnia, a commercial 
contractor has been providing complete subsistence support for rations (other than 
military operational rations). In order to avoid the inability ofthe commercial and military 
distribution systems to talk directly, the contractor is serving as a "bridge" to fill this gap. 
The contractor is responsible for aggregating ration demands and forwarding them to food 
suppliers. This support is very limited in nature, and generally consists ofFF&V, dairy 
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products and breads. Some perishable, semi-perishable and B-ration (canned) items are 
also supplied using this method. 
Contractor support in Bosnia has been seen as effective by DPSC. However, the 
support is expensive and is being terminated by DoD due to rising costs of LOGCAP 
support (GAO-NSAID-96-204BR, July 1996; ACES, September 1996). Once this 
contract is terminated, supply support will revert to the military. Long term implications 
of the switch will be minimal since the contract will be terminated at about the same time 
as forces are due to redeploy from Bosnia (currently forecasted as December 1996). 
Ration support will most likely revert to standard operational rations (B, T, J\1RE) 
eliminating the concern of the handling of commercial rations in the military distribution 
system. However, current supplies of operational rations are dwindling and industry has 
had the benefit of time to get prepared to supply these rations. This point will be 
discussed in the following section on Unitized Group Rations and current contingency 
plans. 
In Bosnia, the use ofT A V to track shipments has been expanded from the level 
used in Haiti. At a presentation conducted in Fort Lee, VA, the CASCOM Battle Lab 
demonstrated that the current system can show not only that tagged items have been 
shipped, but can also show full detail on the contents of the shipment, supply flow 
between RF tag interrogators, number of tags inbound, ages of tags at choke points, and 
aggregate numbers of tags at a choke point. 
The technology is very exciting, and when coupled with ration supply, can provide 
the ability to manage subsistence shipments as "moving inventory." Not only can 
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commanders see where shipments are they can see what shipments are where, what is in 
the shipment, and where it is going. Once a shipment is marked with an RF tag, that 
shipment becomes visible to the military system by way of an interrogator located at key 
points along the distribution pipeline. In Bosnia, these points have been airports, sea 
ports, bridges, and military supply units. 
However, one problem with tracking subsistence in Bosnia has surfaced in the 
creation of source data. To create a tracking tag, the data entered at the point of shipment 
must be accurate and encoded in a compatible format. Shipments coming from 
commercial vendors were not tagged and were thus "invisible" to current Army asset 
tracking systems. Shipments sent first to military depots were tagged, but if the item was 
not first in inventory, source data had to be entered "on-the-spot" and suffered from a lack 
of completeness and accuracy. 
Contractor support of rations in Bosnia did not suffer from this same problem. 
The contractor controlled both ends of the supply pipeline and was not constrained by 
where rations were purchased. Although this situation was advantageous, it did not allow 
military commanders much flexibility in what was supplied. In essence, the contractor 
could "see" his inbound supplies, compare them with projected demand, and force his 
internal system to compensate for discrepancies. However, placing this responsibility 
exclusively on contractors has proven to be prohibitively expensive. (GAO/NSAID-96-
121BR; GAO/NSIAD-96-204BR) 
LOGCAP contracting for the subsistence function in Bosnia is effective but is also 
expensive. Military perishable subsistence platoons exist in the force structure that may 
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have been able to perform this function at a lower cost. By not using military personnel in 
the resupply of rations, long-term recommendations and suggestions for improvement are 
restricted to contractor input. Also, by not using military units in the field, training 
requirements for military personnel are harder to quantify and recognize. Fuller 
understanding of the military and commercial role, coupled with better total cost data, will 
help better define what future roles and missions are best suited for military or LOGCAP 
support. 
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IV. PLANNED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
This chapter will discuss the Unitized Group Ration (UGR), the T -ration, the B-
ration and the A-ration meals. Army contingency plans call for the heavy use of 
operational rations, specifically MRE's, early in a conflict with a rapid transition through 
the ration families (See Figure 5). The MRE and other special Operational Rations are 
designed for usc under special operational conditions. Special Operational Rations are 
Ration Requirements (Army Only) 
,.----
F==- -- MRE UGR-T UGR-B UGR-A 
C+21 100% f------- - --
Day 22-30 60% 40% 
Day 31-60 50% 40% 10% 
Day 61-150 30% 30% 30% 10% 
Day 151-198 10% 30% 30% 30% 
UGR Demand Forecast (Modules) 
UGR-T UGR·B UGR-A Total 
Day46-80 90,000 20,000 0 110,000 
Day81-90 150,000 150,000 45.000 345,000 
Day91-120 150,000 150,000 45,000 345,000 
Total 390,000 320,000 90,000 800,000 
Figure 5: Wartime Feeding Plan. C-date is contingency start day. Percentages reflect 
meals served of a given ration type. (Chester, September 1996) 
entirely military-specific and do not meet the criteria for Prime Vendor supply as discussed 
in this thesis. The Army plans to replace T -rations, B-rations, and A-rations with the 
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UGR. However, these older ration types had some benefits and disadvantages that must 
be addressed with the introduction ofthe UGR (Figure 6). 
A. UNITIZED GROUP RATION 
Currently, the main operational ration that will be used (initial configurations are 
now being tested) by the Army is the UGR. It is broken into 3 distinct types of rations. In 
general, it consists of a unitized portion containing all components required to make one 
complete meal for 100 soldiers. The only separate items handled are the entree for the 
UGR-A, enhancements (e.g. extra spices), and supplements (e.g. milk and bread). The 
entree meal is what generally distinguishes the three types ofUGR. For the UGR-B, the 
RATION COMPARISON* 
UGR-A UGR-B UGR-T T-Ration B-Ration 
Shelf Life 18 mos. 18 mos. 18 mos. 12-36 mos varies (yrs) 
Configuration 4 meal 4meal 4meal 12 18-meal 2 breakfast 
modules per modules per modules per modules and2 
pallet (same pallet (same pallet (same (same menu) lunch/dinner 
menu) menu) menu) per pallet) meals per 
pallet 
# meals/pallet 400 400 400 216 400 
Preparation Refrigeration, Food Heat, or add Heat, or add Food 
food preparation water, and water, and preparation 
preparation, (including re- serve. serve. (including re-
and cooking hydration) Container is Container is hydration) 
and cooking the serving the serving and cooking 
vessel vessel 
*"A" ration is not included due to variety of ration and non-standardization. 
Figure 6: Comparison of rations by type (FM 10-23, April 1996). 
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entree would be a dehydrated or semi-perishable food item, a UGR-T entree is "heat and 
serve" in a special can, and the UGR-A entree will be a frozen or fresh item. A major 
purpose ofthis family of rations is to use quick-prepared and/or ready-to-use commercial 
products. By using readily available commercial food items when possible, demands on 
the industrial base for military specific items is reduced, and the resupply of these items 
becomes less expensive and faster. 
The UGR is designed to simplify and streamline the process of providing high 
quality meals in the field by integrating and standardizing components of the older A, B, 
and T ration meals. The UGR develops a standard product (A, B, and T configured alike) 
for use throughout the battlefield and uses off-the shelf components (e.g. instant gravies) 
to speed-up meal preparation. 
The UGR is tentatively planned to be a depot-packed, modularized ration that 
reduces the number of line items handled by ration activities and significantly reduces the 
chance of not having a needed item on hand. This ration can only be used when organized 
food service facilities exist in the field (Chester, Tray-Pack Industrial Preparedness 
Measure September 1996). The "unitization" of the meals expedites handling of the ration 
and ensures that field kitchens are issued complete meal sets at FRBP's. (FM 10-23, April 
1996) 
Currently, the Army is the only Service with plans to use the UGR. The Marine 
Corps has made plans to continue use of the older B-ration and T- Ration meal. This 
break in common feeding plans comes as a result of the relatively short shelf-life of the 
UGR as noted previously in Figure 6. Although the UGR-B and UGR-T ration have 
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shelf-stable entree and main components, the unitized portion of the ration has 
components that expire in 18 months, thus effectively limiting the shelf life of the ration to 
18 months. Previous generations ofthe B-ration and T-ration did not share this problem. 
The meal modules were more shelf stable but required supplementation and did not come 
pre-configured into "complete meal" modules. (DPSC, September 1996) 
B. THE TRAY-PACK (T) RATION 
The Tray-Pack Ration is essentially similar to the UGR-T ration except that it 
contains only core components and is configured to modules that support 18 soldiers. 
These modules contain the main portion of the meal, but require supplementation at the 
FRBP to constitute a complete meal. Current peacetime demand for the T -ration has been 
very low and has prevented adequate expansion of the industrial base beyond the core 
suppliers of MRE' s and other operational rations. Low peacetime demand has also caused 
the number ofT-Ration suppliers to shrink. The key component ofthe T-ration which 
makes it military-unique is the packaging of the special can housing the entree. Although 
the entree has been prepared according to military specifications, the preparation of the 
entree is not difficult within existing commercial capability. However, the can body and 
lid are unique and represent the logistical choke-point in the supply of this ration. 
(Chester, Tray-Pack Industrial Preparedness Measure, September 1996) 
1. Logistical Choke-Point 
Production ofthe T-Ration (and UGR-T) depends heavily on the supply of can 
bodies and lid bodies. The required can is used by two or more Services, i.e., those that 
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use the T-ration or UGR-T, typically has low peacetime but high wartime requirements, 
and is critical to current Service field feeding plans. This particular can, while being 
military-unique, has a limited shelf-life and production base of one manufacturer. Shelf-
life usefulness is determined mainly by protection from environmental variables such as 
humidity (corrosion), infestation (sanitation, microbiological growth), and temperature 
(warping, cracking) and not a set time frame. To sustain production, the Army originally 
had forecasted a 10 million Tray-Pack can peak demand. The highest actual demand in 
peacetime has only reached a supply of 3 to 4 million cans, and current plans only call for 
a consumption of 600,000 cans. (Chester, Tray-Pack Industrial Preparedness Measure, 
September 1996) 
2. Production Shortfall 
The Army has projected a demand of7.98 million cans across 150 days of a 
mobilization. This demand cannot be met by the current supplier, Central States Can 
Company. Central States can only produce 3.042 million cans in the same period. This 
shortfall in capacity does not reflect Marine Corps requirements. The Marine Corps also 
depends heavily on this component for the production of the existing T -ration meal. 
Currently, no funding exists to provide for an inventory of cans or can components to 
offset the shortfall. Installation of a second production line to expand capacity in a 
contingency would require 120 days, and Central States has not committed to sacrificing 
production floor space used for commercial customers. However, Central States is willing 
to maintain the current line because it is still generating a profit. (Chester, Tray-Pack 
Industrial Preparedness Measure, September 1996) 
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C. THE B-RATION 
The B-ration primarily consists of semi-perishable items in cans. In the current 
Army 1 0-day menu, approximately 100 different food items are used. This ration was 
originally designed to provide breakfast, lunch, or dinner when it was not possible to 
resupply using perishable foods. The ration substitutes for perishable items on an item-by-
item basis. (FM 10-23, Aprill996) 
The B-ration is stored in a unitized form in 100 soldier sets at DLA warehouses. 
Current DPSC plans call for the elimination of all inventory stocks and the conversion to a 
"just -in-time" (JIT) inventory control system. With JIT, vendors provide direct delivery 
of supplies to demand locations, eliminating intermediary inventories. Commercial items 
also will be substituted, where possible, for all B-ration items. Previously, B-rations were 
defined by military specification. However, through the experience gained by Prime 
Vendor, all but 36 items can be directly substituted with a commercially-available item. 
This concept is identical to the Prime Vend or system used for peacetime facilities and 
installations except that Prime Vendors currently do not unitize meals according to a pre-
defined headcount (such as 100-soldier modules). (DPSC, September 1996) 
The UGR-B will replace the old "unitized" B-ration, and will incorporate the 
commercial items now available. Commercial items will flow from food distributors into a 
"unitization point" where all the components will be packaged into a complete 1 00 soldier 
module. The modules will then be palletized according to meal, and shipped. Currently, 
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no War Reserve funding exists for pre-positioned stockage or inventory for this ration 
type. (DPSC, September 1996) 
1. Unique Components 
Studies are underway by the DPSC to determine the ability of vendors to supply 
standardized B-rations (Blaney, October 1996). The ability ofthe vendors to supply the 
standardized B-rations should be sufficient, but these items must be thoroughly cross-
referenced and cataloged against the previous B-ration listing. The possibility of sourcing 
these items through the commercial sector has not been validated since 1989; however, 
these items are generally consumed in the private sector. Nevertheless, 23 items require 
special packaging to conform to U.S. Navy requirements. These items differ from their 
commercial counterparts in packaging only. An additional 13 "peculiar" (military-only) B-
rations are required by the Services. These items are dehydrated and do not generate 
peacetime demands. (Blaney, October 1996) 
An interesting fact influencing the use of commercial B-rations is that while the 
grocery distribution system is highly-standardized, wholesale food distributors are not. 
While the grocery industry makes widespread use of standardized sizes and bar coding, 
food distributors have generally standardized can sizes, but not their bar coding 
mechanism. In essence, this means that there could be two identical cans, but with 
different bar code information (if present at all). Subsequently, the military cannot rely on 
the current bar code technology used in the commercial wholesale sector until it becomes 
more standardized. The food distribution industry expects that to occur somewhere 
around 2005 (Ford, September 1996). 
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2. Differing Service Configurations 
Each Service is currently planning to use a different configuration of the B-ration 
meal to support the DoD contingency plan. The Marine Corps will continue to use 
existing unitized or loose B-rations, while the Air Force will use "loose" B-rations. 
"Loose" B-rations are B-rations that have been palletized and shipped by item in no 
particular menu or meal configuration. The Army is the only Service with plans to use the 
UGR-B. 
D. THE A-RATION 
A-rations include both perishable and semi-perishable food items. Perishable items 
require refrigeration and increased fuel, equipment, water, and preparation requirements. 
Introduction of this ration into the feeding plans in a contingency requires the fielding and 
use of extensive refrigeration assets. Current and projected force structure is not 
configured to adequately support the total requirement expected in the present 
contingency plan oftwo simultaneous medium regional conflicts (MRC's). The bulk of 
refrigeration support will most likely come from the use of host-nation support, local 
purchase, or use of refrigerated shipping containers and ice chests. (FM 10-23, April 
1996) 
A-ration meals have generally been configured according to menus based on the 
availability of rations and the necessary support equipment. Typically, A-rations are not 
predefined or configured, and rely primarily on a mixture of other ration types previously 
discussed, mixed with a perishable entree. The UGR-A ration will attempt to standardize 
62 
this ration by providing a standard meal module minus the entree. The "trick" to this type 
of configuration would then consist of timing the supply of the perishable entree with the 
delivery ofthe remaining meal module (DPSC, September 1996). In previous conflicts, 
when major meal components were separated, they often did not arrive simultaneously or 
even at the same location. According to DPSC, "in Desert Storm, they were unable to 
marry up flameless ration heaters with MRE' s in the right place, at the right time" (Viola, 
October 1996). 
E. JOINT TOTAL ASSET VISIDILITY (JTA V) 
Asset visibility in military shipments has been an ongoing concern. Each Service, 
as well as private sector companies, has implemented various technologies to enable more 
efficient management of supplies flowing in transportation networks. A workshop held 
July 20-22, 1994 by the Technology Committee ofthe National Defense Transportation 
Association outlined four focus areas of concern: 
- Capturing Information on Direct Vendor Shipments 
- Overall Process Improvement and Compliance 
- Implementing Multiple Automated Identification Technologies 
- Standardized documentation and labeling 
These focus areas form a crucial portion of the JT A V effort achieve "Battlefield 
Integration." These areas represent convenient way of categorizing a variety of problems 
that were identified by military, commercial and government participants with current 
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operating methods. By implementing these focus areas, concentrated effort can be applied 
to further improve existing processes. (Technology Committee, September 1994) 
1. Battlefield Integration 
JT A V efforts incorporate each Service's asset visibility efforts under one umbrella 
to promote inter-operability. Each Service manages food differently, and current Service 
systems cannot effectively interface with commercial inventory or ordering systems. 
JT A V seeks to overcome Service "stovepipes" for supply visibility and open 
supplies/inventories to all Services. By opening inventories to wider visibility, demand 
patterns can be better visualized, and duplicate items can then be consolidated to provide 
better economies of scale with reduced duplication. 
2. Army Efforts 
In an attempt to cut down on manual order processing, the Army is developing a 
standard food ordering system. This system will interface with the systems presently used 
to place orders in the field. By tying the requisition processing into existing systems, 
Army units will now be able to track food requisitions in the same system being used to 
track all other supplies. All orders for food in the field are processed manually according 
to the Army Field Feeding System. FRBPs receive the orders and also keep manual 
records. Automation of the Army's food requisition and tracking system is currently non-
existent. 
Army efforts will integrate order processing through the Unit Level Logistics 
System (ULLS). In garrison, orders are processed via the Army Food Management 
Information System (AFMIS). As previously discussed, the Subsistence Prime Vendor 
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program has provided interfacing with commercial vendors via the Subsistence Prime 
Vendor Interpreter (SPVI). However, no such interface currently exists for integrating 
military field ordering systems with the commercial sector. AFMIS " ... was not designed 
for, and will collapse" (ACES, September 1996) if it is used for field ordering. AFMIS is 
a strong system for what it has been designed to do, but it has been modified many times 
and has been developed along a completely divergent line from the tactical distribution 
system. As a consequence, it would take less resources to develop automated capability in 
the tactical system than to attempt to further modify AFMIS. Emplacement of AFMIS in 
the field would also entail the establishment of duplicate ordering systems ( AFMIS and 
ULLS side-by-side) or the design of an another interface to provide data into the tactical 
supply system from AFMIS. 
3. Interfaces with the Commercial Sector 
As previously discussed, little "true" asset tracking capability exists between the 
military and commercial vendors. Some inroads have been made in ordering systems, but 
these systems generally have not provided a total view of the supply transaction from 
"birth" to "delivery." In interviews with Nestle Foods and Purdue Farms, they noted that 
while they have extensive visibility over what is in their organic distribution system, little 
information is freely exchanged with third-party freight forwarders. In some cases, other 
companies, such as Wal-Mart, have overcome these barriers by forcing "upstream" 
suppliers to adopt their distribution and ordering systems. Inter-company interfaces such 
as those that exist at Nestle and Purdue are similar in nature to the differing interfaces 
between each Service and of the Services with the commercial sector. 
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Purdue Farms values instantaneous data on each shipment as indicated by their 
high degree of investment in satellite tracking systems and the mobile networking 
capabilities of their organic fleet. For example, Purdue managers can find out where 
(within 100 meters) a truck is, what its speed is, and the temperature of its cargo at any 
given time. Any problems with the shipment or route can be coordinated with the driver 
in the cab via fax or cellular phone. With third-party freight forwarders, some have similar 
capabilities, but the two systems have not been integrated. (Hurley, March 1996) 
Purdue Farms is trying to establish better data links with transportation companies, 
but while some are open to the notion of instantaneous data exchange, others have no 
intention of pursuing this kind of relationship. As a result, Purdue Farms' distribution 
control personnel have to coordinate "off-line" with transportation company personnel to 
determine actual shipping status. Purdue Farms intends on cultivating the ability to 
interface with third party systems directly to provide better control, waste less 
administrative time, and enjoy a more dynamic relationship with their business partners. 
(Hurley, March 1996) 
Nestle Foods has initiated a vendor managed inventory program with Lucky Foods 
in an effort (by Lucky) to reduce warehousing and distribution costs. Nestle monitors 
their inventory levels at Lucky central warehouses and replenishes them as necessary. 
This allows Nestle to keep Lucky's turnover rate for Nestle Products high at 52 times a 
year. Actual demand patterns are transmitted daily to Nestle from Lucky to build accurate 
forecasts and demand patterns. Nestle makes inventory decisions for Lucky and has 
managed a 98% customer service level at all times. This has benefitted Lucky with fresher 
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products, higher customer service levels, lower warehousing costs, and increased velocity 
of product through their warehouses. When Lucky was managing their own inventory and 
using more conventional supplier relationships, they were only obtaining about 20 
inventory turns a year. The ability to rapidly turn inventory allows the company to keep 
smaller inventories on hand, reducing inventory carrying costs. (Braden, August 1996) 
While Nestle has established a dynamic data link with Lucky, the data relationship 
is not perfect. While Lucky can "see" what is in their warehouse, they cannot see 
projected inbound shipments or "upstream" supply status in Nestle Warehouses. This 
relationship also creates a loss of control for Lucky, now that inventory decisions are 
made by Nestle. In addition, some problems with billing have occurred with regards to 
pricing. Occasionally, some Nestle customers may have received special offers from 
Nestle marketing personnel, but the Nestle distribution activity may be unaware of the new 
price. Nestle's Marketing Division data is not linked to their Distribution Division and 
pricing information is not shared. Subsequently, Lucky pays only the Nestle Marketing 
agreed upon price and not Nestle's Distribution expected price, creating some 
administrative difficulty at Nestle's Customer Service. Most ofthese problems can be 
attributed to incompletely linked inventory, marketing, and distribution systems, that 
communicate the required data elements instantaneously to each key stakeholder. (Beebe, 
August 1996) 
4. Vendor Express - 2 (VENEX-2) 
VENEX-2 was originally designed to overcome program shortfalls in the Medical 
Prime Vendor Program. It was specifically designed in conjunction with the Department 
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of Transportation to rectify problems with requisition/supply visibility in a conflict. 
(Popielis, September 1996) VENEX-2 is an outgrowth of a program called Vendor 
Express (VENEX) that was initially started in 1994 to facilitate the commercial resupply 
of medical material by producing automated Government Bills of Lading (GBL) for the 
vendor. (Vendor Express System Master Design, October 1994) 
Under VENEX, one shipment comprised of many orders is assigned only one 
shipment number or Transportation Control Number (TCN) and contains no record of 
individual orders. Although individual order data is retained in the vendor's system, 
shipments do not "carry" their own order-level identity. Data on items contained within 
the shipment itself, must be retrieved "off-line" from the vendor's own internal system. 
VENEX-2 extends this capability by allowing the shipment data to also indicate what 
individual orders are being carried within a given shipment or TCN by query of the 
existing Global Transportation Network (GTN). GTN is basically a worldwide system 
that provides shipment visibility. T A V expands on this system by adding line item detail. 
Initial VENEX-2 plans called for developing a system that will provide shipment 
data to the GTN (or TA V network), however, no clear guidelines were established on the 
level of detail that would be provided. It is possible, though, to modify VENEX-2 to be 
able to provide data to the GTN (see Figure 7), allowing detailed order shipment data to 
be queried by the user. In fact, establishing the interface with vendors has been more 
difficult administratively than technically. The technology exists in both data formatting 
and hardware to accomplish the necessary tasks. However, early identification of vendors 
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Figure 7: Notional VENEX-2 flow. GTN/TAV/LIF databases would receive continuous 
data feedback on shipment location via radio frequency interrogators along shipping route 
and at major "choke points" such as bridges, airports, and sea ports. MILSTRIP 
transactions are military-unique standard information sets. (Popielis, September 1996) 
can be integrated into the vendor's local area network (LAN), and personnel training can 
be conducted. (Troup, August 1996) 
Using VENEX-2 in a modified form to input detail data into the GTN is intriguing. 
The system can effectively tum the interface between the military and commercial sectors 
into a more dynamic environment. Integration of a standard computer directly into the 
vendor's distribution management system allows the vendor to more rapidly receive orders 
and the military to receive almost instantaneous shipment data. The implication for this is 
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that it becomes feasible for a food handler in an overseas conflict zone to query their local 
Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS) computer and receive 
immediate information on the shipment status of a particular ration requisition. The 
envisioned Battlefield Distribution concept requires a joint, integrated ST AMIS as the 
heart of the logistics management capability on the battlefield. (USACASCOM, 
September 1995) 
With the technology demonstrated at Fort Lee (USACASCOM, September 1996), 
it become~ possible for the food manager to see exactly where all inbound shipments of 
food are in the supply pipeline. By gaining the total snapshot of the inventory moving 
from supplier to military warehouse, the manager or field commander gains insight on 
potential bottlenecks in the supply flow. The manager or commander can then bring 
resources to bear on specific, identified, constraints to ensure uninterrupted supply flows. 
The incorporation of the civilian sector with a VENEX-2 type system increases supply 
visibility and allows further elimination ofwasted steps in the process. Specifically, 
supplies will no longer have to flow through Defense Depots to gain shipment visibility. 
Instead, these supplies can be tagged at the vendor and shipped directly to the appropriate 
shipping location for follow-on shipment to the theater of operations. Additionally, 
vendors potentially can receive aggregated orders from the military T A V network directly 
through the government system that has been integrated into their own networks (See 
Figure 7). 
An additional benefit to developing such a system will come in the enhanced ability 
to schedule supply flows. Once the vendor is "tied" into the T A V network through a 
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system such as VENEX-2, the military distribution system becomes a "Shades of Green" 
system. This system process sees the logistical supply of commodities as a continuum 
from raw material to finished good. 
In the case of the Unitized T -rations, it becomes more manageable to time the 
supply of foods into a unitizing point for configuration, tagging, and onward movement as 
meal modules. Meal Modules that incorporate separate components, such as the UGR-A, 
can now have those items tracked visually via computer to ensure shipments arrive at the 
same FRBP at the same time. This will alleviate previous problems exhibited in Desert 
Storm ration resupply. Also, this system can allow the vendor to suggest alternative 
shipping means, or to provide recommendations on how to improve supply flow through 
the system. For instance, the vendor may already have established supply lines or facilities 
near the hostile area that could provide the government savings in money or time. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In general, Prime Vendor is a valid resupply method. However, current 
operational plans do not match vendor capability. The ability of the private sector to react 
will be predicated by the speed at which they can absorb military demand in a contingency. 
Since the military demand is not projected to exceed 4% of total U.S. annual demand, 
difficulties in gross resupply of non-military-unique food items are not expected (DPSC, 
September, 1996). Unfortunately, effective resupply of subsistence in the national 
contingency mission necessary to match existing military plans cannot be accomplished. 
Plans must be changed to reflect budget reality, or funds must be allocated to develop a 
working subsistence supply capability congruent with existing plans. New methods of 
extending business partnerships in the management of inventory and demand must be 
established for responsible resupply of food to U.S. soldiers in a cost-effective and 
expedient manner. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Adopt Prime Vendor for Operational Rations other than MRE's 
DPSC is planning to adopt a zero-base inventory for rations other than MRE's. 
The effective integration ofvendors will ensure that once DPSC's buffer stock is depleted, 
all foreseeable problems are acted upon before they become a crisis. Prime Vendors can 
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produce and provide vendor-managed inventory functions to dilute inventory holding 
costs within the much greater commercial market. In essence, providing the vendor with 
requirements and allowing them to provide the needed inventory response serves as a form 
of inventory consolidation for the military. Allowing the commercial sector to provide 
inventory response permits them to rotate stock with all their customers; military and 
civilian. 
2. Match Planning to Fiscal Intent 
The DoD field feeding plans reviewed in the research for this thesis are unrealistic. 
The Services must be willing to spend money to either maintain inventories at appropriate 
levels or to implement complete solutions to plans. If inventories are not desired, then 
alternative plans must be built, researched, and established. At the end ofFiscal Year 
1996, a moratorium was put in place by the Services on the consumption of operational 
rations (DPSC, September 1996) due to budget constraints. While this does provide a 
short-term cost-savings, inventory rotation rates drop, causing inventory to grow older. 
This analysis has found that Prime Vendor, as a concept, is perfectly valid and 
possesses many opportunities. However, the mismatch of contingency plans with 
capability and the tendency to perform "end-runs" of these plans through LOG-CAP 
contracts or by outsourcing functions, is inefficient. As demonstrated, large gaps appear 
in planning, in essence forming logistical "loose bricks" (Hamal and Prahalad, May-June 
1996) that can potentially be exploited by hostile nations. 
While the previous method of handling food distribution is unwieldy and wasteful, 
an incautious move to contingency ration distribution via Prime Vendor could be 
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disastrous. If conducted unwisely, this may lead to "denominator management" (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1996) and a failure to recognize and retain key core logistical competencies. 
Managers with a denominator management focus do not distinguish between external 
sourcing that "adds value" with outsourcing that causes a strategic weakness. Arbitrary 
replacement of an organization's internal competency may weaken other "deeply 
embedded organizational competencies." These deeply embedded competencies are those 
that are truly yielding "product embodied competitiveness" (Hamal and Prahalad, May-
June 1989). In the case of the military, this "product embodied competitiveness" may be 
capabilities such as notification-to-deployment time, ability to sustain forces, ability to 
sustain morale, or the ability to exert appropriate force levels. 
For example, food distribution is widely regarded as being a global industry. If a 
hostile country were to start misbehaving, they would not have to directly confront the 
U.S., but merely apply pressure to those businesses engaged in long term contracts with 
the military. While this may appear to have minor impact, if consideration of alliances and 
countries disapproving ofU.S. policy is taken, the impact can become substantial. If these 
same countries know that the U.S. has reduced/eliminated inventories as cost-savings 
measures, then they know that little buffer stock exists to cover any variability in supply. 
Commercial companies now covering this reduced defense capacity are motivated largely 
by profit and regulatory compliance. Typically, these companies can be strongly 
influenced by changes in governmental attitudes and markets. As a result, certain 
countries may perceive the inability ofthe U.S. to react immediately by implementing 
established plans, as a weakness to be exploited. 
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The inadequate integration ofplans, as analyzed in this study, presents a 
fundamentally flawed strategic fit between resources (budget) and opportunities (re-
engineering). Instead, these plans appear to be generic strategies with a focus on a 
strategic hierarchy that does not identify a clear method of accomplishing stated goals. 
This type of dichotomy creates a logistical "loose brick" (Hamel and Prahalad, May-June 
1989) that could pose a competitive disadvantage for the U.S. in the event of a major 
crisis. Current planning and solutions attempt to improve on existing methods by "playing 
the same game better" (Hamel and Prahalad, May-June 1989). Therefore, a shift to a 
more "Innovative Strategy Method" (Schuler and Jackson, August 1987) is needed to 
provide a better solution. 
If the military is going to consider pursuing a strategy of adopting "Best Business 
Practices" via programs such as Prime Vendor, then the military must shift thinking to 
terms of"competitive advantage" (Porter, 1985) and "organizational uniqueness" (Ulrich 
and Lake, 1991). Prime Vendor programs can help the Army gain competitive advantage 
by building on the Army's core competencies and allowing it to outsource those functions 
that do not add value to those competencies, while, at the same time, supporting 
synergistic partnerships between the Army and its Prime Vendors. However, unwise 
application of outsourcing can inadvertently eliminate valuable competencies along with 
non-value added activities. According to Pfeffer (February, 1995), sources of competitive 
advantage evolve over time and should be analyzed in terms or both external and internal 
environments (Pfeffer, February, 1995; Barney, November, 1995). As these environments 
are dynamic, competitive advantages may change as the result of "value migration" in 
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customer needs and priorities that can be dealt with by discarding obsolescent business 
designs that have tended to remain fixed (Slywotzky, 1996). 
Specifically, competitive advantage can be achieved by the way we match 
customer needs to core competencies and produce true organizational uniqueness. 
Organizational uniqueness is the extent that each one of our business (waging war) 
elements (logistics, combat arms, combat support) have world class performance. If 
carefully translated, such principles can be readily adopted to military planning and 
execution. As an example, the Army constantly seeks to gain competitive advantages over 
other military forces to ensure dominance on the battlefield. This has been done in the 
past by clarifying organizational uniqueness in terms of force projection with a strategic 
business partner; the Air Force in Air-Land Battle Doctrine. 
While economic battles being waged in the private sector differ from battles 
engaged in military conflict, the jockeying for dominance and the attempt to gain an 
advantage for decisive victory are strikingly similar. However, the emphasis on 
competitive advantage must come from both an internal and external analysis of core 
competencies across organizational boundaries. Such thinking requires a paradigm shift 
from traditional hierarchal and marketplace strategy to one that combines the best of both, 
allowing the military control of its processes while retaining the market advantages of the 
private sector. 
Traditionally, commercial companies and the military have sought downsizing and 
outsourcing of functions to improve productivity or to lower costs. When not carefully 
conducted, downsizing has been termed "dumbsizing" (Markels and Murray, March 
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1996). Establishment of an effective supply plan requires a true rethinking of the process, 
not simply a focus on shrinking the government's share of it. Too often, both private 
business and the government equate downsizing with efficiency (Hammer, July 1996). 
The outsourcing of subsistence support and other logistical support should not be merely a 
short-term reaction to changes in the environment, but rather as a carefully constructed 
long-term strategic plan (Bruton, May 1996). In my proposed model using VENEX-2 
(Figure 7), the commercial sector becomes a strategic business partner as opposed to a 
replacement capability. 
The way for the U.S. military to truly exact a real "competitive edge" in logistical 
support, lies in the fundamental changes that must take place in the way we "play the 
game." For instance, if supply support is to be truly effective, movement must be made 
away from the concept of"government/military" or "commercial" support. This has 
served to limit the current planning process and create a situation where no truly 
comprehensive solution is being pursued. Instead, a movement towards a "shades of 
green" supply mentality must be incorporated into the military thought process. The 
commercial supplier becomes our business partner and supplies can be seen as gaining 
more military identity as they move through the total pipeline. 
3. Develop Peacetime Usage and Inventory 
Peacetime Use of Operational Rations will provide the military with valuable 
lessons and feedback on the actual use of rations. To date, the industrial base has 
demonstrated an unwillingness to expand their commitment to providing military ration 
configurations unless a sufficient on-going draw of these rations occurs. This has directly 
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created a shortfall in the ability to provide T -rations in the current conflict scenario. If 
vendor-managed inventory practices are used in conjunction with other initiatives, cost-
savings can be realized that would offset expenses. These off-sets would come in the form 
of private sector experience in configuring these rations, feedback in ration improvements, 
a "warm base" of production that can more easily ramp up for contingencies, and training 
for military food-handlers and cooks. 
4. Standardize Service Subsistence Requirements 
Currently, each Service maintains a different field feeding plan that requires slightly 
different configurations of the same basic ration type. This practice is wasteful and dilutes 
an already small peacetime military demand on the commercial sector. In any given 
theater of operations, each Service will be promoting the use of a different ration type, 
requiring different preparation procedures, accountability procedures, and inspections. 
Even if one ration became the designated ration of use in the theater, personnel from the 
other services would have to made aware of the differences in rations to ensure adequate 
meal preparation and accountability of supplies. Greater economies of scale and improved 
efficiency could be achieved by defining Service ration requirements according to the same 
ration configurations. This also reduces the amount and type of training required to 
produce, distribute, and use rations. 
5. Adopt VENEX-2 (Modified) 
VENEX-2, in a modified form, provides the ability to tightly integrate commercial 
suppliers into the military network while retaining flexibility in support. The integration of 
commercial vendors allows for tight business partnerships and the ability to share common 
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"visions" of supply support. In the event of the termination of a supplier, the lessons 
learned from integration can be applied to new suppliers thus lowering the learning curve 
of implementation. VENEX-2 provides the advantage of obtaining complete supply 
visibility ·without relying on integration at a single military-controlled point. This reduces 
the chances of commercial supplies becoming backlogged at a distribution point, and 
reduces the strain at "downsized" supply depots. Costs to implement VENEX-2 for the 
medical community at seven vendors has been estimated to be $1.361 million for a 12 
month period including travel, implementation, equipment, Volpe G&A, contractor 
support, and labor. (Ken Troup, June 1996) 
However, implementation ofVENEX-2 will tend to create an organization without 
boundaries. As information flows between the vendor and the military customer, clear 
distinctions between where the vendor stops and the military begins will begin to blur. 
Careful partnering and stakeholder management must be undertaken in concert with 
VENEX-2 to reap the total benefits that can be gained from data integration. (Harrison, 
May 1996) 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Standardized Rations 
During the course of this thesis the food distribution plan has remained in dynamic 
flux. In addition the emergence of diverging ration support plans by each of the Services 
is troublesome. This may dilute the ability of the military to gain economies of scale and 
to implement a working peacetime plan. Several new technologies, such as polymeric T-
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ration cans, are being studied that may fundamentally change the shortcomings of rations 
as discussed here. Ration configurations should incorporate these technologies, if 
adequate, to develop a standard ration family for all Services. 
2. Inventory Maintenance vs. Ordering Costs for Operational Rations 
Current plans have proven inadequate for the national contingency mission. 
However, to support a peacetime level of inventory (vendor or government controlled), 
detailed anal\sis should be conducted to determine the costs of holding inventory versus 
trying to order it all in a contingency. Plans examined in this thesis did not evaluate this 
tradeofi hut the general opinion expressed was that inventories were too expensive. 
3. \1rasuring Logistics Effectiveness 
Discreet measures oflogistics effectiveness in how and when to order are crucial. 
In the food realm, food previously had been held for extended lengths of time without 
regard for customer preferences. This choice was often made due to cost and not 
according to any definitive set of logistics decision models or effectiveness measures. 
4. Application of Model to other Commodities 
This thesis provides the basis of a T A V model that should be examined for 
application to other commodities in either a limited or complete fashion. Commodities 
that may be amenable to a Prime Vendor/VENEX-2 application include repair parts, at 
least those that are common with the automotive industry, and bulk fuel shipments. 
5. Cost Analysis of Contractor Logistics vs. Military Logistics Support 
The Bosnian Operation used a commercial vendor to provide ration breakdown 
and logistics support in Bosnia. This support was regarded by those interviewed in this 
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thesis as being expensive. When queried as to why a Perishable Subsistence Platoon had 
not been deployed, no definitive answer was given. A cost/benefit analysis limited to this 
aspect of the operation could lead to insight on LOGCAP break-even points and military 
risk analysis. 
6. Depot vs. Commercial Unitization 
The final location and type of unitizing point for the UGR family of rations has not 
been determined. Commercial vendors have the capability of providing unitizing 
capabilities, but existing production lines at DoD depots can also provide this function. 
Near two of these Depots there may be reserve units who could be mobilized in a conflict 
to provide "surge support" in the production ofUGRs. Additionally, if these depots and 
units were used for this mission, the units could conduct periodic training that may 
support a peacetime usage rate. A cost-benefit analysis coupled with a capacity-load 
analysis would provide valuable insight on the disposition of unitization points and the 
supportability of a peacetime inventory/use policy ofUGRs. 
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